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PREFACE

Modern corporate takeover battles resemble closely the
feudal wars of the Middle Ages.

A corporation that fears a

raid by a Black Knight builds a Castle of charter amendments
and changes in its corporate structure designed to make a

takeover difficult.

Then it attempts to establish

a

reputa-

tion for fierce resistance to takeovers by strongly rejecting
all proposals to discuss alliance by merger.

At the same

time, the serfs are pacified with increased dividends and a

shareholder relations campaign.

The Count warns his noblemen

against fraternization with raiders.

Frequently mercenaries,

lawyers specializing in takeover battles, are specially

retained to advise as to the design of the Castle, to peri-

odically check the ramparts and smooth the glacis and to be
available on short notice in the event of a surprise Saturday
night special attack.

promulgate

a

The King is petitioned repeatedly to

takeover law banning from the Kingdom all raids

and raiders or at least making raids almost impossible.
a

If

raid does come, the Council is convened, the Clergy is

consulted and the mercenaries, if not already on retainer,
are hired.

The Board of Directors is the Council.

Like the feudal

Council, it is often subservient to the Count.

However,

2

almost impossible and the Castle will quickly be lost.

The

King demands that the Council act in good faith and on

a

reasonable basis to further the best interests of the serfs,
not the Count and his noblemen.

The Council almost always

obeys the King's command for they know that they live in the

Kingdom of the shareholder derivative lawsuits and the SEC's
enforcement proceedings.
The investment bankers are the Clergy.

They consult the

scriptures by Moody and Standard and Poor and damn the

takeover as unfair and inadequate.

They review the household

accounts and bless the continued independence of the Castle.
They comfort the serfs.

Count and the Council.

They strengthen the resolve of the
They know the Bishops of Wall Street

and can read their signs as they appear on the tape.

They

know the mercenaries and if the need arises, they act as

emissaries to the neighboring Castles in the sometimes

desperate last-minute quest for

a

White Knight.

The shields of the mercenaries are their legal opinions;
the pikestaffs are their lawsuits.

Their religion is

loyalty, royalty, persistence and ingenuity.

Grail is the showstopper defense.

Their Holy

They advise that with the

blessing of the Clergy, the Council has

a

reasonable basis

for rejecting the takeover bid and defending against the

raid.

This protects the Council against being held to

account by the King's commissioners or the judge of the
serf's derivative lawsuit.

Then, the mercenaries march

against the Black Knight in court and regulatory agencies,

.
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probing his lines for weak spots and fighting at every turn.
Their mission is to lift the siege.

Or, at the very least

to hold the Castle until the Clergy have found a White

Knight
If despite the incantations of the Clergy and the sorties

of the mercenaries, the Castle is about to be invested and

the serfs are about to rebel, in rides the White Knight.
He is a neighboring Count or foreign potentate of greater

resources than the Black Knight.
his train.

He too has mercenaries in

He vanquishes the Black Knight, repacifies the

serfs and rebuilds the Castle.

But, alas,

it is the White

Knight's men who sit now at the Council table.

The Count

either swears fealty to his new overlord or joins his fellow
exiles in Palm Beach.
So goeth the takeover wars.

The scriptor is deeply indebted to all the noblemen,

fellow mercenaries, and fellow squires for their support and
(linquistic)

advice in writing this epic.

The scriptor also wishes to express his sincere thanks to
the noble scribes for reviewing and approving this epic.

My special thanks to that certain noble scribe who made
it possible for the scriptor to visit,

United Counties.

study and work in the

INTRODUCTION

Acquisitions of United States corporations have become
increasingly complex battles for control of such corporations, as hostile tender offers are met with competing

offers, counter-offers, self-tender offers and other defensive measures.

Bidders and targets frequently are forced to

pursue simultaneous strategies of hindering one tender offer

while encouraging another, thereby blurring the defensive-

offensive labels traditionally applied to the participants
With the growing complexity of takeover

and their tactics.

contests, litigation has emerged as an important defensive

Bidders frequently resort to litiga-

and offensive tactic.

tion to pre-empt target actions and to ensure a more

favorable forum.

Targets use litigation to ward off

a

takeover attempt or to gain a reprieve while alternative
strategies are considered and implemented.

Target lawsuits are many and varied.
assert violations by
laws,

a

Targets commonly

bidder of federal and state securities

federal antitrust laws, federal margin regulations,

federal and state regulatory systems and, most recently,
federal anti-racketeering laws.

2

The principal federal regulation of takeovers consists of
2a
section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934,^

which governs proxy solicitations, and the Williams Act,

5

which is the primary statute governing tender offers.
tion 14

(a)

Sec-

authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission

to prescribe rules governing the solicitation of

("SEC")

proxies.

The purpose of Section 14(a)

and the rules promul-

gated thereunder is to prevent management or individuals

opposing target management from obtaining authorization for
corporate action by means of deceptive or inadequate disclosures in proxy solicitations.
The Williams Act, the principal tender offer legislation,
has added Sections 13(d),
Act.

2c

14(d), and 14(e)

to the Exchange

The purpose of the Williams Act and the rules promul-

gated thereunder is to protect individual investors by

requiring the disclosure and reporting of material information relevant to the impact of

a

possible acquisition of

shares or a tender offer and to allow investors sufficient
time within which to make an informed investment decision.
In enacting the Williams Act, Congress sought to protect

investors not only by furnishing them with necessary information, but also by preventing either the target management or
the bidder from obtaining undue advantage that could

frustrate the exercise of informed choice.

The SEC has

recently attempted to bolster the regulatory scheme governing
tender offers by amending several rules promulgated under the

Williams Act. 2e
Failure of the bidder to comply with the disclosure and

reporting requirements of the federal securities laws is almost always alleged by the target in its suit attacking the

offer.

The alleged non-disclosures or misstatements cover a

broad range: 2f the bidder's purposes in making the tender offer as well as any "plans or proposals" it has for the

target; g the bidder's financial statements;

the impact

upon the target of the offeror's acquisition of control;

relationships between the bidder and the target;

-*

the

bidder's financing of the offer, including pertinent provisions of loan agreements and the possible use of the target's

assets to repay the loans; 2k whether purchases of target
'

stock prior to

a

bid violated state or federal law, or

whether the bidder's conduct violated Rule 10b-13 of the
Exchange Act; 21 or, failure by the bidder to disclose sensitive payments or other questionable business practices.

Furthermore Section 14(e) prohibits fraudulent and deceptive
practices in connection with tender offers.
Section

7

of the Clayton Act prohibits all mergers or

acquisitions whose effect "may substantially lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."

The Clayton Act

provides two remedial provisions for private antitrust

enforcement of Section

7.

Section

4

awards treble damage to

anyone who suffers injury in his business or property by
reason of

a

violation of antitrust laws,

and Section 16

entitles any person threatened with loss or damage by any

antitrust violation to injunctive relief. ^

As a private

party, the target of a contested takeover may seek an injunc-

tion under Section 16 to enjoin the contemplated action by

"

.

7

alleging

threatened violation of Section

a

7

of the Clayton

Act.

The target may seek to enjoin purchases of its stock where
the bidder's purchases are financed in violation of the mar-

gin regulations adopted by the Federal Reserve Board pursuant
to Section 7(f)

of the Exchange Act. " Regulation U,

in

general, prohibits a bank from extending credit directly or

indirectly secured by any "margin stock," and in order to
purchase "margin stock," if the stock exceeds the "maximum
loan value" of the collateral.

2r

Regulation X prohibits the

borrower-bidder from obtaining credit that is secured
directly or indirectly by "margin securities" in order to
purchase an amount of that stock in excess of its "maximum
loan value

.

2s

Targets are also seeking to block unwanted tender offers
under the broad provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO").
is unlawful to receive income from

2t

RICO provides that it

racketeering activity and

to invest such money in the acquisition of an interest in an

enterprise affecting interstate commerce.
Many states have enacted takeover statutes which impose

reporting and other regulatory burdens upon bidders similar
to or beyond those imposed by the Williams Act and sometimes

restricting the terms of the tender offer themselves.

Tar-

gets have alleged violations by the bidder of those state

statutes 2v
j.

j.

i_

.

8

Furthermore, targets often bring common law claims against

bidders or their allies, typically alleging that the bidders
or those associated with them are breaching their fiduciary

duties

2w

Most takeover situations in today's takeover contests are

potentially volatile and unpredictable.

Given these cir-

cumstances, litigation may create opportunities for the

target and uncertainties for the bidders.

Although in itself

litigation outside the antitrust area usually does not determine the outcome of
a

a

contested takeover bid, it often plays

successful role in the target's overall strategy and on

several occasions has had a dispositive effect.

However, at

this time, judicial reactions to takeover litigation appear
to be generally unsympathetic:

courts are skeptical about

target claims, and reluctant to obstruct premium offers and
free market dynamics.

In addition,

a

well-prepared bidder

will have been advised to anticipate, and be ready to defend
against, aggressive litigation.

Accordingly, it is not

likely to be thwarted merely by the burden, expense, or

potential delay that litigation may cause.
Nonetheless, if the target's primary objective is to
remain independent, litigation may provide the avenue to
success, even though success usually requires

a

substantive

violation by the bidder that results in an injunction against
the offer and that cannot be readily cured.

Litigation may also accomplish several strategic purposes.
For one thing, it affords the possibility of delay.

With the

9

demise of state takeover laws, the target is likely to have
only about thirty days to implement a defensive strategy if
one is available, or to find a White Knight.

Additional time

is often precious and litigation may be the only way to ob-

However, absent

tain it.

a

reasonably strong claim for

relief, such as where the bidder is engaged in

a

continuing

fraud or has committed fairly egregious disclosure violations,

4

the courts are currently declined to delay tender

Litigation also demonstrates the target's resolve,

offers.
and,

in some cases, has been used as an overall strategy to

stymie and demoralize the bidder.

Another strategic purpose

applies in cases where the target expects difficulty in
finding

a

White Knight and may have to negotiate with the

bidder to increase the offer in that situation, litigation
may be one of the few bargaining chips the target has.
However, it will be worth something only if the legal claim
is wrong,

or if the bidder feels vulnerable or anxious to

avoid litigation.

Although litigation by

a

target is customary, it does

entail certain disadvantages.

In addition to the fact that a

suit rarely stops an offer, it is expensive, will usually

generate counter litigation by the bidder, and will always
involve discovery demands on the target company.

Under cer-

tain circumstances, the threat of litigation may be more

effective than an actual suit.

Commentators have written

a

great deal in recent years

about management resistance to takeover bids.

Some believe

.

10

that a target management's decision to oppose

tender offer

a

is an ordinary business judgment and therefore protected un-

der the "business judgment rule."

5

Others claim that target

management ought not be afforded such latitude, arguing that
this application is illogical,

inconsistent with Congress

1

goals in adopting the Williams Act, and, given the functions

performed by tender offers, ultimately unwise.

Participants in this debate have generally avoided very
close scrutiny of particular defensive tactics employed by
target managements.

While the literature addresses, in

rather cursory way, the propriety of certain defenses,

7

a

most

of the discussion focuses on the broad question of management

resistance in general.

There is, in particular, little

analysis of litigation against the tender offeror,

p

a

tactic

that target managers commonly employ with considerable effec-

tiveness
It is well known that target managers commonly respond to

unwanted takeover bids by suing the bidder*
actly, do target managers sue?

But why, ex-

Is it effective?

Who

benefits from these suits?
In this essay,

I

shall try to analyze the use of such

litigation by target company managements.
I

argue that target managers generally sue bidders to

thwart takeover attempts and, more importantly, often
succeed, thus maintaining their control over the target.

This result,

I

shall argue, is hardly in the best interest of

target shareholders or, for that matter, society at large.

I

11

therefore conclude that target lawsuits should be viewed with
suspicion and perhaps subjected to rules designed to limit
the harm such lawsuits can cause.
In Chapter I,
I

explore the motives of litigious targets.

I

briefly examine the takeover defense literature on target

litigation which indicates that target managers usually sue
bidders in order to defeat unwanted takeover attempts.

I

also suggest that judicial reactions to target lawsuits

largely confirm this hypothesis.
In Chapter II,

I

try to provide an overview and insight

in the challenges that have been brought by targets in their

efforts to thwart takeover attempts.
I

then discuss, in Chapter III, the effectiveness of such

judicial challenges with regard to their desirability as

a

defensive measure in view of target shareholders' interests.
I

conclude in Chapter IV by proposing reforms that would

limit harmful target litigation without unduly restricting
the ability of target managers to seek redress for legally

cognizable wrongs.

I

also suggest that the alleged benefits

of target litigation can be obtained more cheaply and effec-

tively under the approach that

I

propose.

5

CHAPTER

I

THE GOAL OF TARGET LAWSUITS
A.

WHY TARGETS SUE

Plaintiffs ordinarily file lawsuits with the goal of obtaining relief from allegedly illegal conduct by defendants.
One might therefore assume that targets sue bidders in order
to prevent or remedy unlawful tender offers or tender prac-

tices.

Nevertheless, there are

a

number of reasons for con-

cluding that target managers often sue bidders in order to
impede unwanted offers, with little concern whether their

lawsuits assert meritorious legal claims.

First, special-

ists in the strategy of control contests commonly urge the

commencement of litigation as
tender offers.

a

means of thwarting unwanted

Indeed, the literature suggests that these

specialists view target litigation as

a

virtually automatic

response by any target management wishing to resist

a

takeover attempt. 12
For example, one lawyer observes that litigation against
the bidder is axiomatic and is "something that always gets

done...." 13

Another notes that target managers almost always

seek recourse in court claiming that the unwanted tender

offer is in violation of the Williams Act' 14 the federal

antitrust laws, and any other laws the target's imaginative
counsel has discovered.

1

The same lawyer notes that "[i]t
12

13

has become a reflex action for the target company to combat
an offeror by alleging violations of section 14(e)

antifraud provision of the Williams Act..."

- the

and that

"[a]ntitrust claims are often raised whether or not the cir-

cumstances warrant it." 17
Similarly, some have urged target managers to consider
the use of defamation actions against the bidder's management
as a weapon in corporate control battles.

1 8

And even scholars

further removed from the fray of control contests have stated
flatly that "[o]ne of the most effective defensive strategies
is to invoke the aid of courts."

19"

In view of these ex-

amples, the following observation by the authors of a leading

text on securities regulations seems apt:

exception, any announcement of

a

"Almost without

takeover bid is now in-

stantly followed by an injunction action filed by the cor-

porate management charging the "raider" with most of the
crimes in the Decalogue, but usually stopping short of

statutory rape."i.20
i.

4.

0-

Empirical studies of target litigation report that targets litigate in approximately one-third of all takeover attempts, including those that are unopposed by target management.

21

These data are therefore consistent with the

proposition that target managers often use lawsuits against
the bidder as a tactical device for resisting an unwanted

offer.

Given the strategic advice that takeover specialists

commonly offer 22 and the complexity of the claims typically

14

asserted in such actions, 23 it is difficult to resist the

conclusion that targets sue bidders almost reflexively as

a

defense response against unwanted offers. 24

Judicial reactions to target lawsuits suggest that
courts recognize the tactical nature of much anti-takeover
litigation. 25
.

.

In some cases,

to the litigants'

courts have referred expressly

attempts to use the courts to further their

objectives in their struggle over the control of the target
company and have denied the target motion for

a

preliminary

injunction against the bidder reasoning that the target's

management were simply trying to protect their entrenched
position.

Plainly, judges ar growing less patient with

this defensive tactic; they are wary of frivolous claims and

critical of target management attempts to wage control contests in the courts.

27

Of course, it is tempting to conclude in light of this

increasingly common judicial attitude that the courts can and
do view target lawsuits with appropriate suspicion and that

further regulation of this defensive response is unnecessary.

Proponents of this view would cite judicial disapprovals of
target litigation not as evidence of
solution,

28

a

problem in need of

a

but rather as proof that the courts themselves

are effectively checking attempts to use litigation im-

properly as a weapon in control contests.
somewhat differently, since

a

29

To put this

grant of relief presupposes

that the plaintiff's claim has merit, a decision that relief
is warranted obviates the danger that target managers may be

.

15

using litigation inappropriately to entrench themselves in
office

Target managers may oppose takeover attempts for many
reasons, including a good faith belief that such opposition

may result in a better deal for their shareholders. 30

It

would be unfair and inaccurate to conclude that target

managers oppose tender offers only to retain their control
over a target's assets.

On the other hand, target managers

can suffer serious losses in takeovers; relinquishing control
can involve an obvious loss of wealth and stature, often

through forfeiture of firm-specific human capital. 31
B.

LITIGATION HAS A TACTICAL VALUE
While ignoring the self-interested incentives of target

managers to fight control bids would be unrealistic,

a

variety of tactical considerations can lead target managers
to file lawsuits against hostile bidders with little regard
for the underlying merits of such suits.

managers hope that

a

Occasionally,

lawsuit will actually result in

a

permanent or temporary injunction against the bid and thus
defeat an unwanted takeover attempt. 32

Thus, target managers

sometimes sue bidders under the Clayton Act, 33 claiming that
the proposed takeover would substantially lessen competition.

Similarly, targets may bring injunctive actions asserting

violations of other substantive legal requirements, such as
disclosure requirements under the federal and state
securities laws, the federal margin regulations or common
law.

34

In these cases,

the plaintiffs hope that the lawsuit

.

16

will be

a

"show-stopper" 35

-

a case in

which the court finds

sufficient evidence of illegality to warrant at least

preliminary injunction against the offeror.
a

a

Issuance of even

preliminary injunction often effectively kills

a

hostile

tender offer, for it postpones indefinitely the bidder's ex's

ecution of the offer;

r

only the rarest of bidders would keep

an offer open under such circumstances, even if it

were willing to incur the considerable expense of a trial. 37
Of course, in order to convince the court to issue a

preliminary injunction, the target management must go
way toward proving illegal conduct by the bidder.

a

long

Although

the standard may vary from one court to another, a plaintiff

seeking
a

a

preliminary injunction generally must establish

likelihood of success on the merits and

of a damage remedy for the alleged wrong.

(2)
3 8

(1)

the inadequacy

Show-stoppers

are therefore rare where target managers are acting purely

tactically, with no regard for the merits of their legal
claims 39
A more realistic goal of target litigation is to delay
the tender offer beyond the usual minimum period of twenty

business days. 40 Target managers may accomplish this goal by

obtaining relief that has the effect of extending the offer.
For example, a court may respond to alleged disclosure viola-

tions by ordering that the offer remain open for a certain

period following full and complete disclosure by the bidder.

41

Alternatively, even where the target managers have

little hope of obtaining a preliminary injunction against the

.

17

bidder, they may be able to persuade the court to issue a

temporary restraining order that effectively delays execution
of the bid.

42

Delay can significantly enhance a target management's
efforts to resist

hostile bid.

a

It affords managers more

time to defeat the bid by implementing a variety of defensive

measures. 43 or, as

merger with

a

a

last resort, arranging for a friendly

"White Knight." 44

It also increases the risk

45
and expense of the offer,
which may cause the offeror to

abandon its takeover attempt.

Thus, while delay does not al-

ways help managers preserve their control of the target
firm,

46

it is perceived as a useful strategy in control con-

tests

While most tactically motivated target lawsuits are
filed with the hope of blocking or at least delaying the un-

wanted offer, there are other strategic considerations that

motivate target managers to sue.

First, suing underscores

the target management's determination to defeat the bid.

Litigation signals the target management's determination to
the bidder, to the market in which the target's shares are

traded, and more particularly, to risk arbitrageurs.

48

Since

target shareholders frequently try to avoid the risks of the
tender offer process by selling their shares to arbitrageurs, 49 the latter'
of control contests.

s

actions often determine the outcome

Thus, it is in the interest of en-

trenched target management to convince arbitrageurs not to
tender to a hostile bidder.

Litigation can help accomplish

18

that end by increasing the arbitrageur's perception of the

likelihood that the target managers will defeat or delay the
offer or at least facilitate a bidding contest.

Arbitrageurs

who anticipate any of these outcomes will hold rather than
tender

either to avoid tying up their shares in

-

a

delayed

or unsuccessful offer, or in the expectation of a higher

subsequent bid.

Another tactical value of litigation is that it
allows for wide-ranging discovery, which, in addition to

being

with

a
a

source of expense and delay, provides target managers

wealth of information regarding the bidder and the

tender offer. 51

Much of this information may be useful for

resisting the takeover attempt, even if it is only marginally
relevant to target management's lawsuit. 52
Finally, target managers can offer to settle existing

litigation as

a

concession in negotiations with the bidder

for more favorable merger terms.

Admittedly, this tactical

use of litigation hardly aids in resisting an ultimate

takeover'

53

but it does suggest yet another reason why

management may sue for largely strategic purposes. 54
In summary,

resistant, self-interested target managers

have powerful tactical incentives to sue hostile bidders,

whether or not their action represents good faith pursuit of
a

genuine legal claim.

As a consequence, the risk that such

managers will assert frivolous claims against bidders seems

peculiarly great, especially when one recalls the apparent
eagerness of some advisers to wage the commencement of

19

litigation as an "automatic" response to an unwanted bid. 55
If so, heightened concern regarding the meritoriousness of

target suits clearly seems appropriate.

CHAPTER II
CHALLENGES BY TARGETS
A.

INTRODUCTION
Increasingly, courts are deciding challenges to specific

actions and practice in takeover battles by looking to the

purpose of the Williams Act

to guarantee that shareholders

receive full information about tender offers. 57

Since the

Act was not intended either to promote or to inhibit tender

offers, courts are loath to allow its requirements to be

shaped into tools favoring either side in

a

takeover contest.

Nonetheless, the Williams Act has been used to challenge non-

disclosures by the bidder before, during and after

a

tender

offer. Similarly, targets have sued unwanted bidders under

other federal and state securities laws, federal and state

antitrust laws, margin regulations, and racketeering laws as
well as common law.
B.

CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S OPEN-MARKET AND PRIVATELY

NEGOTIATED STOCK PURCHASES
Two parts of the Williams Act may apply to a bidder's

conduct outside
more than

5

a

formal tender offer.

If the bidder owns

percent of the target's stock, it must obey the

disclosure requirements of Section 13(d),
closures may be challenged.

58

and its dis-

The bidder's disclosures may

20

21

also be challenged under Section 14

(d)

59

if its stock

purchases constitute a de facto tender offer.
Before a tender offer is announced,
may accumulate up to

a

prospective bidder

percent of a target's stock through

5

open-market or privately-arranged purchases before subjecting
itself to Section 13(d).

which it is

a

Once the bidder or

member acquires more than

5

a

group of

percent of an

issuer's stock, however, the bidder or the group must file

Schedule 13D disclosure statement
days.

a

with the SEC within ten

Thereafter, the Schedule 13D must be amended when

any change occurs which makes the previous disclosure inac-

curate or inadequate.
that has acquired

5

fi

3

A target can sue a person or group

percent of its shares for failure to

properly file or amend

a

Schedule 13D.

64

Targets also can

claim that two or more people accumulating target shares are
a

"group" for Section 13(d) purposes and therefore must file

a

disclosure statement.

More typically, targets allege

that the Schedules 13D filed by potential bidders are false
and misleading, particularly by concerning the potential

bidders'

intent to seek control.

In addition to challenges brought under Section 13(d),

targets have alleged that pre-bid purchases of its stock are

actually tender offers conducted in violation of Section
14(d).

The term "tender offer" is not defined in the federal

securities laws.

Absent egregious facts (usually centering

upon the exertion of direct pressure on shareholders) courts

generally have refused to deem these pre-bid purchases tender

22

offers and have refused to integrate these purchases with

subsequent formal tender offers.

fi

7

Some courts have defined "tender offer" according to an

eight-factor test proposed by the SEC.
the court looks for:

c p

Under this test,

active and widespread solicitation

(1)

of public shareholders for the shares of an issuer;

solicitation made for
issuer's stock;

(3)

a

substantial percentage of the

offer to purchase made at a premium over

the prevailing market price;

rather than negotiable;
a

(2)

(5)

(4)

terms of the offer are firm

offer contingent on the tender of

fixed number of shares, often subject to a fixed number of

shares, often subject to a fixed maximum number to be

purchased;
(7)

(6)

offer open only for

a

limited period of time;

offeree subjected to pressure to sell his stock; and

public announcements of

(8)

purchasing program concerning the

a

target company that precedes or accompanies rapid accumulation of a large amount of the target company's securities. 69

Other courts have chosen
on Congress'

a

more flexible approach, focusing

intent to guarantee that shareholders be fully

informed of all information pertinent to their decision

whether to tender their shares or not.

This judicial reluc-

tance to label pre-bid purchases "tender offers" also extends
to post-bid purchases.
In Hanson Trust PLC v.
a

SCM

71
,

the Second Circuit rejected

target's claim that stock purchases by a bidder after the

termination of the bidder's tender offer were a de facto
tender offer and violated Section 14(d).

72

The district

.

23

court previously issued

a

preliminary injunction barring

Hanson from acquiring any additional SCM shares and from

exercising any voting rights with respect to the SCM shares
"7 "3

it had purchased.

"7

On appeal,

A

the Second Circuit re-

The court rejected the application of the Wellman 7 S

versed.

eight factor test, preferring to look at the purpose of Section 14(d).

7

fi

In evaluating the totality of the circum-

stances, however, the court considered a number of the

Wellman factors and found them lacking.

The court found no

added significance in the fact that Hanson's purchases followed almost immediately the termination of its tender offer
and noted that Hanson had already filed with the SEC and made

public substantially the same information that SCM contended
should have been filed before Hanson made the post-bid purchases 77
C.

CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S DISCLOSURES
The three primary bases for challenging the bidder's dis-

closures are Sections 14(a), 13(d), and 14(e) of the Exchange
Act.
1

.

Section 14(a)

-

Proxy Regulations

Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to

prescribe rules governing the solicitation of proxies.
such regulation, Rule 14a-9,

78

statements in proxy materials.

One

prohibits false and misleading

Although Section 14(a) does

not provide an express private right of action, the Supreme

Court 79 has held that rights of action exist and courts,

applying the broad holding of J.I. Case v. Borak

8
,

.

.

24

consistently have granted standing under Section 14(a) to
target corporations.

O

In Mills v. Electric Autolite

Supreme Court reaffirmed the existence of

a

,

1

the

private right of

action despite the express of private liabilities by Sections
9(e)

and 18(a).

82

Under Mills

in order to establish a Sec-

,

tion 14(a) violation, a plaintiff must prove:

defendant's proxy materials contain
statement or omission, and

(2)

(1)

that the

material misleading

a

that the proxy solicitation

itself, rather than the particular defect in the solicitation

materials is an essential link in the accomplishment of the
transaction.

8 3

There is a split in authority as to whether

a

plaintiff also must establish that the defendant acted with
scienter 84
.

.

The definition of "materiality" is well-settled:

omitted fact is material if there is
that

a

a

"An

substantial likelihood

reasonable shareholder would consider it important in

deciding how to vote."

85

In applying the standard,

the ap-

propriate point of view is that of the reasonable investor,
not the sophisticated analyst.

p c

Financial projections and

other necessarily speculative information need not be disclosed, unless the predictions regarding future economic and

corporate events are substantially certain to hold true.

87

Targets have alleged that bidders obtained or sought to

obtain shareholder support through misleading proxy

materials 88
•

i

1

25
2

.

Section 13(d)

-

Reporting Requirement

Section 13(d) of the Exchange Act 8 9 requires
group acquiring more than

5

percent of

a

a

person or

company's stock to

file a schedule 13D disclosure statement with the SEC.

Q

(")

Because Section 13(d) is a simple reporting requirement
rather than an antifraud provision, courts generally have

refused to imply

a

private right of action for damages.

9

The courts have commonly held that the only legal remedy for

misstatements in
18(a)

a

Schedule 13D is that provided in Section

of the Exchange Act, 92 which concerns false findings

made with the SEC. 93

Courts are split over whether

a

private right of action

for injunctive relief can be implied under Section 13(d).

The clear majority

94

of courts have held that target corpora-

tions can seek injunctive relief under Section 13(d),

notwithstanding the availability of injunctive relief under
Section 18

(a)

95
.

Section 13(d) and the rules promulgated thereunder
require the filing of

a

Schedule 13D disclosure statement

with the SEC containing, among other information, the identity and background of the person or group making the filing,
the source and amount of funds used in making the purchases

of securities, the purpose of the purchases and the pur-

chaser's plans or proposals for future dealings with the
issuer or the issuer's securities.

under Section 13(d) concerns the
plans.

5

The most common challenge

percent shareholder's

However, targets have also challenged the

26

disclosures regarding the source of the

5

percent share-

holder's funding, 97 or the identity and background of the
person or group making the purchases.

98

One reaction to the requirement that plans and intentions
be disclosed in detail is the so-called "waffling" dis-

closure.

In Dan River v.

Icahn

99
,

for example, the bidder,

Icahn, filed a Schedule 13D containing a long list of actions

that Icahn and his associates might consider in deciding

whether to seek control of the issuer.
approved Icahn'

s

The Fourth Circuit

disclosures.

Section 13(d) disclosure requirements also have been used
to obtain an injunction against an impeding tender offer

where the mandatory disclosure would result in the violation
of a pre-existing confidentiality agreement.

102

Section 13(d) claims can be important even after the bidder begins a formal tender offer. Two district courts have

enjoined tender offers and ordered rescission or divestiture
because the bidders had accumulated large blocks of shares on
the basis of misleading Schedules 13D.

103

In those cases,

the courts reasoned that the Section 13(d) violations allowed

the bidders to obtain "blocking positions" which inhibited

competing offers and made it difficult for the targets to
104
arrange other business communications.

Circuit has rejected

a

However, the First

target's contention that a bidder who

already had obtained 17 percent of the target's shares held
an unfair "blocking position."

27
3.

Section 14(e)

-

Tender Offer Fraud

Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act

i

n

ft

prohibits fraudulent

and deceptive practices in connection with tender offers.

Because the language of Section 14(e) tracks that of Section
10(b)

and Rule 10b-5, the elements of Section 14(e)

and Sec-

tion 10(b) violations have been deemed identical, except for
the 10(b)

requirement of

a

stock purchase or sale.

10 7

In order to establish a violation of Section 14(e),

plaintiff must prove

(1)

a

that the defendant has made a mis-

leading statement or omission in connection with a tender
offer;
(3)

(2)

that the misstatement or omission was material;

that the defendant acted with scienter; and

(4)

that the

misstatement or omission caused plaintiff's injury. 10 8

The

Seventh and the Second Circuits have held that there can be
no violation of Section 14(e) unless the prospective bidder

actually makes

a

tender offer. 109

In actions seeking injunctive relief, courts typically

assume that the scienter and causation elements are met if
the plaintiff demonstrates that the misstatements or omis-

sions are material.

tion 14(e)

The standard for materiality under Sec-

is the same as that applied in proxy contests:

whether "'there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable
shareholder would consider it important in deciding' whether
to accept the tender offer."

As with other sections of

the Williams Act, however, Section 14(e)

claims are increas-

ingly seen as mooted by curative disclosures.

28

The courts consistently have implied a private right of

action on behalf of target corporations seeking injunctive
relief under Section 14(e). 112
implied

a

The Eleventh Circuit has

private right of action to compel corrective dis-

closures, 113 but has denied a private right of action seeking

divestiture. 114

Whether

a

target has a private right of

115
x
action *for damages
is unclear.
i

Section 14(e)
14(d).

is the enforcement provision for Section

Section 14(d) and the rules promulgated thereunder

require the filing of

Schedule 14D-1 disclosure statement

a

with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the dissemination of certain information of certain information to the

target's shareholders, including the identity and background
of the bidder, the source and amount of the bidder's funds,

financial information about the bidder, and any "additional
i

i

c

material information."
Targets have successfully alleged
in bidder's Section 14(d)

a

long list of defects

filings, but courts are increas-

ingly likely to reject the target's claim unless the bidder's

failure to disclose is clearly material.
Arend,

Thus, in Diamond v.

the court rejected a series of challenges to

a

bidder's disclosures as involving immaterial or non-deceptive
issues.

"The Court is not inclined to subject every tender

offer to a nit-picking judicial scrutiny."
(a)

118

Failure to Disclose Control Purpose

Although nondisclosure of an intent to achieve control is
more commonly a pre-bid Section 13(d) violation, the claim

.

29

also can arise as a Section 14(d) violation in tender offers
for less than 50 percent of the target's stock.

119

The

failure to disclose adequately that the bidder presently has

control over the target also can serve as

a

basis for

relief.120
,

.

(b)

Failure to Disclose Post-Offer Plans

Targets often allege that bidders have failed to describe

adequately their plans to make material changes in the
target's management or operations. 121

However, in gauging

the accuracy of bidders' disclosures about their future plans
for the target, courts often recall Judge Ainsworth's state-

ment in one of the first cases interpreting the Williams Act:
"Though the offeror has an obligation fairly to disclose its

plans in the event of a takeover, it is not required to make

predictions of future behavior, however tentatively phrased,
which may cause the offeree or the public investor to rely on
them unjustifiably."
(c)

122

Failure to Disclose Financial Information
about the Bidder

Even in an "any-and-all" offer, courts have required that

bidders reveal substantial financial information about themselves.

In Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realt y,

123

the Second Circuit enjoined a tender offer pending the filing

of additional disclosures.

Judge Friendly ex-plained:

"If

the bidder is in a flourishing financial condition, the

stockholder might decide to hold his shares in the hope that,
if the offer was only partially successful, the bidder might

30

raise its bid after termination of the offer or infuse new

capital into the enterprise.

Per contra

,

a

poor financial

condition of the bidder might cause the shareholder to accept
for fear that control of the company would pass into ir-

responsible hands."
The Third Circuit's decision in Flynn v. Bass Brothers

Enterprises 125 may signal
'

move toward requiring bidders to

a

disclose asset valuation appraisals and other "soft information."

Traditionally, courts have not imposed

a

duty on bid-

ders to disclose such appraisals, reasoning that they could

mislead shareholders.

Noting

a

trend within the SEC

favoring disclosure of "soft information," however, the court
in Flynn held that in an appropriate case a bidder's asset

appraisals must be disclosed.

The determination whether such

information must be disclosed in a particular case requires

balancing the potential aid such information will give
shareholder against the potential harm.
to be considered are:
is based;

127

a

Among the factors

the facts upon which the information

the qualifications of those performing the

appraisal; and the purpose for which the information was ini-

tially intended.

128

The Delaware Court of Chancery recently

followed the Flynn approach.

129

Despite this move toward greater disclosure, a potential
bidder need not reveal which firms it is considering bidding
on when it raises funds for acquisitions.

Pantry Pride

130
,

a

Thus in Revlon v.

target was unsuccessful in challenging the

.

31

bidder's prospectus, where the bidder had revealed its intent
to use the capital raised to finance acquisitions.

131

Failure to Disclose Inside Information about Target

(d)

Obtained by Bidder
In Crane v.

Westmghouse Air Brake 132 the Second Circuit
,

held that a friendly bidder "was an 'insider* with respect to
the trading of

[the target's]

stock" and should have dis-

closed that it was engaging in "extraordinary buying" of
target shares "coupled with... large secret sales off the

market." 133

Failure to Disclose the Offer's Potential Adverse

(e)

Impact on Target
In Sonesta International Hotels v. Wellington Asso-

ciates 134 the Second Circuit ruled that a bidder violated
,

the Williams Act by failure to disclose details of a substan-

tial debt owed to the target that might have been compromised
if the offer were successful.

The court also held that the

bidder should have disclosed that the target's stock might be

delisted from the New York Stock Exchange if the offer were
135
*
successful
i

Other Failures to Disclose

(f )

In Alaska Interstate v. McMillian
a

the court enjoined

,

tender offer because the bidder failed to disclose substan-

tial impediments to achieving control.

Pepsico

13 8
,

137

In Valente v.

the court held that when the bidder had specific

plans to merge with the target in the future, the bidder

should have described the existence of appraisal rights.

13 Q

32

140
However, in Revlon v. Pantry Pride
the court ruled that
,

the bidder need not disclose the identity of a potential

target "until the offeror has definitely determined to

acquire the target corporation and finally decided on the
terns of the offer."

141

Finally, some courts have found

violations of the Williams Act where bidders have failed to
disclose substantive violations of other statutes, such as
the antitrust laws.
D.

CHALLENGES OF THE SUBSTANCE OF A TENDER OFFER
Courts have thus far refused to sanction the use of the

federal securities laws to examine the substance of tender
offers.

This refusal is rooted in the purpose of the Wil-

liams Act, which is to guarantee the availability of all

necessary information on tender offers while maintaining
strict federal neutrality between the bidder and the incumbent management.
In Santa Fe Industries v. Green

143
,

the Supreme Court

held that conduct which does not involve either

misrepresentation or nondisclosure is not "manipulative"
within the meaning of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act 144
and Rule 10b-5 thereunder,

145

which prohibit the use of

"manipulative or deceptive devices" in connection with the

purchase or sale of securities.

Section 14(e) of the Ex-

change Act prohibits "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative
acts or practices in connection with any tender offer...."

Given the similarity in language of the two provisions, one

would expect that the 10b-5 requirement of misrepresentation

"

33

or nondisclosure would extend to implied causes of action

under Section 14(e) as well.
In Mobil v. Marathon Oil

147
,

however, the Sixth Circuit

held that conduct which admittedly was not deceptive may

nevertheless be manipulative within the meaning of Section
14(e).

The Sixth Circuit's rationale in Mobil was expressly

disapproved by two other Circuit Courts of Appeal, 148 and was
recently rejected by the Supreme Court in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern 149

The law is now clear that in an action

.

under Section 14(e),

a

plaintiff may not escape the require-

ment of alleging and proving misrepresentation of nondis-

closure merely by characterizing the defendant's conduct as

"manipulative

.

For example, courts have held that in the absence of

fraud or deception, a front end loaded, two tier tender offer

which is a tender offer for less than all of
standing stock at one price followed by
at a lower price,

Radol v. Thomas

,

a

a

target's out-

second step merger

does not violate Section 14(c).

In

the Court of Appeals accepted the lower

court's finding that the two-tier offer was not manipulative.
The court also found that acquiescence in the two step trans-

action by the target's directors was not a breach of their

fiduciary duty and was protected by the business judgment
,

rule.

152

Similarly, the Fifth Circuit recently ruled that,

without misrepresentation or nondisclosure, the payment of

34

"green-mail" does not violate either Section 10(b) or Section
14(e).

153

CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S COMPLIANCE WITH OTHER FEDERAL

E.

LAWS
1

Antitrust Laws

.

If the bidder's control over the target may substantially

lessen competition in a line of commerce, the target can

challenge the bidder's efforts under Section
Act.

154

7

of the Clayton

However, in Cargill v. Montfort of Colorado 155 the
.

,

Supreme Court recently held that a competitor must allege an

"antitrust injury" to have standing under the Clayton Act.

Whether and how Cargill affects lawsuits brought by targets
against hostile bidders is unclear.
7

When applicable, Section

provides one of the best defenses against a hostile tender

offer because antitrust violations spawned by the takeover
may be incurable.

Takeovers typically are described as horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate.

In a horizontal takeover, the

combining firms produce or sell the same product in the same
geographic area.

In a vertical takeover, the combining firms

do not produce the same product but possess

possess)
ship.

a

(or could

customer-supplier or supplier-customer relation-

In a conglomerate takeover, the combining firms do not

produce the same product and do not share any special
relationship.

Targets successfully have challenged tender offers on the
ground that the horizontal effects would substantially lessen

.

35

competition.

In a few instances, targets successfully have

alleged anticompetitive vertical effects. 157 Targets rarely
have been successful in challenging conglomerate takeovers 158
In Cargill

159
,

the Supreme Court recently held that a

competitor must allege an "antitrust injury" in order to have
standing under Section 16 of the Clayton Act, but refused to
adopt a per se rule denying standing to competitors alleging

predatory pricing.

Whether and how Cargill will affect suits

by targets seeking to forestall their own acquisition is

unclear.

Even in horizontal takeovers, courts tend to view targets antitrust claims skeptically, recognizing that "target

companies are quick to seek refuge in Section

unfriendly takeover."

against an

7

Courts realize that "[t]he grant of

a

temporary injunction on antitrust grounds at the bequest of

a

target company spells almost certain doom of

a

tender

As a result, courts often have looked to the

offer."

Justice Department's Merger Guidelines

1

ft

7

as a means for

gauging the target's likelihood of success.

The Merger

Guidelines, issued in 1982 and revised in 1984, reflect

continued reliance on economic analysis.
address five key areas:
ment;

(2)

(1)

a

The revisions

market definition and measure-

factors that may affect the significance of con-

centration and market share data in evaluating horizontal
mergers;

(3)

the treatment of foreign competition;

treatment of efficiencies; and

(5)

(4)

the

the treatment of failing

36

divisions of healthy firms.

The Justice Department state-

ment accompanying release of the 1984 Guidelines indicated
that "the revisions are intended to correct any misperception
that the Guidelines are a set of rigid mathematical formulas
that ignore market realities and rely solely on a static view
of the market place."
In formulating other defenses,

targets must consider

whether they will compromise viable antitrust claims.
Naturally,

a

counter-tender for the shares of the bidder

forecloses an antitrust challenge.

Contacts with potential

white knights also may hinder the target's antitrust defense
if acquisition by one of them would create comparable

Several targets that have obtained

antitrust problems.

preliminary injunctions against bidders have been awarded
attorneys'

fees under Section 16 of the Clayton Act.

Courts have refused to grant targets a private right of

action under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act
That Act amended the Clayton Act to provide for

of 1976.

notification to the Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department and

a

review

period before the consummation of certain corporate acquisitions including certain tender offers.
2

.

Margin Regulations

Although courts generally have refused to permit borrowers or investors to seek private remedies under the margin

provisos of Section

7

of the Exchange Act,

1

6R

some courts

37

have held that targets do have standing to challenge bidders'
..
169
margin violations.
•

,

Two courts, while refusing to permit a target to sue

directly under Section

7,

have nevertheless suggested that a

target might have standing under Section 14
the bidder failed to disclose its Section

7

(e)

to allege that

violations.

Neither court, however, found a violation of Section 14(e).
The Court in Revlon

171

found that there was no Section 14(e)

violation because the debt in question was exempt from margin
requirements, and the court in Nachman 172 held that Section
14(e)

was inapplicable because no tender offer had occurred

yet.

Margin regulations may play

a

greater role in battles

for corporate control as a result of the Federal Reserve

Board's recent extension of these regulations to cover junk
bonds used to finance

a

takeover.

Under Regulation G,

173

debt securities issued by a shell corporation to finance

stock purchases will be presumed "indirectly secured" for

margin purposes.

The SEC reported in June,

1986, that al-

though junk bond financing has increased substantially in the
last few years,

junk bonds are not now, and are not likely to

become, the dominant method of financing tender offers*

174

On the other hand, the SEC also found that junk bond financing is used primarily in the largest takeover battles, and

suggested that the use of such bonds has leveled off or even
175
declined since the Federal Reserve Board's action.

38

Civil RICO Actions

3.

Targets are seeking to block tender offers may be seeking
recourse in the broad provisions of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act
it is unlawful:

(1)

("RICO").

1

7 fi

RICO provides that

for any person receiving income from "a

pattern of racketeering activity" to use or invest that money
in the "acquisition of any interest"

ing interstate commerce;

(2)

in an enterprise affect-

for any person "through a

pattern of racketeering activity" to "acquire or maintain... any interest in" an enterprise affecting interstate

commerce; or

(3)

for any person employed by or associated

with an enterprise affecting interstate commerce to "participate.

through

a

..

in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs

pattern of racketeering activity."

keteering activity" is defined to include

a

"Rac-

long list of

felonies, most prominently mail fraud, wire fraud, and "fraud

with the sale of securities." 178

A "pattern of racketeering

activity" requires "at least two acts of racketeering
activity" within

a

1
ten-year period. 79

The Act grants an

express civil remedy for treble damages and attorneys'

fees

to "[a]ny person injured in his business or property by

reason of" violations of the Act's provisions. 18
The Act gives federal district courts jurisdiction over

RICO suits, but is silent on whether this jurisdiction is

exclusive or concurrent with the state courts.

district courts have split on this issue.

181

The federal

The first State

39

Supreme Court to consider the issue, however, recently held
that state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over RICO. 18 2
The Supreme Court has interpreted civil RICO for the
first time in Sedima v. Imrex 183 and in American National

Bank

&

Trust Co. v. Haroco 184
.

The Court's broad interpreta-

tion of civil RICO in those decisions may make it easier for

plaintiffs to establish RICO violations in takeover litigation.
In Sedima and Haroco

,

the Court rejected two judicially

created limitations on the use of civil RICO.
Court held that

a

First, the

private RICO plaintiff need not prove that

the defendant has been convicted of predicate acts of

racketeering.

Second, the Court held that such plaintiffs

are not required to establish a "racketeering injury" that is

separate and distinct from the injury caused by the predicate
acts themselves.

More importantly, the Court made clear its

belief that Congress had intentionally drafted RICO with
broad language and that limitations on the use of civil RICO

must therefore come from Congress, and not from the courts.

Although Sedima and Haroco did not directly deal with the
question of whether civil RICO is applicable in tender offer
litigation, these cases have cast doubt on the continuing

vitality of pre-Sedima decisions in which courts criticized
the use of civil RICO in tender offer litigation on the

grounds that Congress intended RICO to apply to the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime, and not to

"garden-variety frauds."

18 5

40

Even prior to Sedima

,

several courts had approved of the

use of civil RICO in tender offer litigation.

Wabash

In Swanson v.

the court refused to dismiss a class action by

,

shareholders of

a

target who alleged that the defendants had

failed to disclose and misstated certain material facts in

connection with

a

tender offer.

In Hanna Mining v. Norcen

Energy Resources 18 7 the court refused to dismiss a target's
,

suit under RICO to enjoin a proposed tender offer.

The

target alleged that the defendants committed violations of

Sections 10(b), 13(d), 14(e) and 20(a) of the Securities

Exchange Act of 1934 in acquiring its stock.

Similarly, in

Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car 18 8 the court refused
,

to dismiss a target's complaint that the defendants had vio-

lated RICO by filing false Schedules 13D in connection with
the purchase of a third company's stock.

Spencer, the target

company, alleged that Agency financed its purchases of Spencer stock with proceeds of the sale of stock of a third com-

pany it had obtained through fraud.

While the future of RICO in tender offer litigation
remains unestablished and courts and private litigants continue their struggle to define the proper contours of

a

civil

RICO cause of action, Congress is taking a second look at the
.

.

.

statute.
4

189
.

Proposed Legislation

In the 99th Congress,

64 individual bills designed to

affect hostile takeovers were introduced, but none were

reported out of committee.

190

Legislation further

41

restricting takeovers is not expected to fare any better in
the 100th Congress.

191

Perhaps the most important of the

bills likely to be introduced is one offered by Senator Proxmire.

His bill would prohibit buy-outs unless approved by

either

a

majority of

a

corporation's independent directors,

or two-thirds of its shareholders.

192

The Reagan Administra-

tion opposes all proposed anti-takeover legislation as unwar-

ranted constraints on the free market. 193
F.

CHALLENGES OF THE BIDDER'S COMPLIANCE WITH STATE TAKEOVER
AND REGULATORY STATUTES
1

.

State Takeover Statutes

Many states have enacted takeover statutes which impose
reporting and other regulatory burdens upon bidders beyond
those created by the Williams Act.

At present, twenty-nine states impose some sort of direct

regulation on the acquisition of shares in tender offers for

corporations connected in any one of the number of ways, to
these states. 194 The scope of most ot these statutes is sub-

stantially similar.
unless:

(1)

None of the statutes applies to an offer

the offer, if successful, would result in the

purchaser's ownership of

a

certain percentage of any single

class of the outstanding stock of the target; and

(2)

there

is some connection between the target corporation and the

involved state. 195 The statutes are roughly split as to

whether the tender offer must result in five percent or ten
196
percent ownership in order for the restriction to apply.

The most common test for determining whether there are

.

42

sufficient connections between the involved corporation and
the regulating state considers whether the corporation is

either organized under the laws of the state or has both its

principal place of business and substantial assets in the
.

.

state

197

Like the Williams Act, most current state takeover laws

both require disclosure of information and restrict the terms
of the offer themselves.

While the information to be

disclosed is for the most part the same as that required by
section 14(d),

19J 8

the timing of the disclosure often differs

from that under section 14(d)

.

A large number of states will

not allow a tender offer to commence unless a filing has been

made with the appropriate state authorities some time

beforehand. 199 Additionally, most states allow the state official charged with the enforcement of the statute to delay
the offer by holding a hearing to determine whether the

requirements imposed by the statute have been met.
With regard to restrictions on the terms of the offer,
state statutes are also in many respects similar to sections
14(d)

and 14(e)

of the Williams Act.

It is in the way in

which some of these requirements are to be met
ticularly with regard to matters of timing

-

and federal schemes differ most importantly.

-

most par-

that the state

Many states

require that offers remain open for periods of time longer
than the federally mandated twenty days.

201

Also, in many in-

stances, the withdrawal provisions differ from those in sec-

tion 14

(d)

202
.

43

Many state statutes contain provisions not found in the

Williams Act.

They commonly require that all offers extend

to state residents as well as non-residents and that the

terms of the offer be substantially the same for residents
and nonresidents.

203

A small number of statutes contain

provisions allowing those portions of the statute found un

constitutional or otherwise invalid to be severed from the
remainder of the statute without invalidating the whole. 204
An action to enforce a state takeover law, initiated

either by the target or by

a

state official, can seriously

impede the bidder's takeover attempt.

When targets sue to enforce a state statute, they
frequently do so in state court and join subsidiaries or
other parties whose presence in the litigation will defeat

diversity jurisdiction.

This prevents the bidder from remov-

ing the case to federal court.

205

The bidder may bring an in-

dependent action in federal court to challenge the state
law's constitutionality, but the abstention doctrine could
•J

preclude

a

AC

speedv resolution of the issue.

To avoid this result, immediately upon commencing their

offers, bidders commonly institute pre-emptive federal court

lawsuits challenging each potentially applicable state
statute.

By filing first, and by alleging that the target is

acting under color of state law in violation of
suit,
_

.

Act.

207

208

a

1983

the bidder also should escape the Anti-Injunction

44

Bidders typically allege that the challenged statutes

violate both the Commerce and Supremacy Clauses of the United
States Constitution.

State takeover statutes thus often im-

pose burdensome requirements on bidders.

However, since the

Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. Mite 209 many cases have
,

invalidated such laws.
However, on April 21, 1987, the United States Supreme

Court in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corporation of

America

210
,

upheld an Indiana statute that severely restricts

the ability of offerors to gain control of a target corporation.

211

.

.

.

The Court deviated from the decisions emanating from

the circuits over the past four years in holding that the

statute does not impermissibly interfere with interstate cor-

porate transactions nor conflict with Federal Securities
Laws

212
.

The Court stated that the statute was within the
.

state's authority to regulate domestic corporations and held
that the statute does not prevent or unduly delay tender
offers, but only provides regulatory procedures designed for
the protection of the corporation's shareholders.
2

.

213

State Regulatory Statutes

Many states also have enacted statutes affecting
acquisitions in certain regulated industries.

Most litiga-

tion to date has involved the insurance industry.

Although

courts have divided on the constitutionality of these
statutes, at least two district courts have held that state

statutes regulating acquisitions of insurance companies enjoy

—
45

blanket protection under the McCarran-Ferguson Act

214

and

215
thus are not preempted by the Williams Act.

CHALLENGING THE BIDDER UNDER STATE COMMON LAW

G.

Targets often bring common law claims against bidders or
their allies, typically alleging that the bidders or those

associated with them are breaching their fiduciary duties.
In Martin Marietta v.

Bendix

2

1

f>

,

the Delaware Supreme

Court relied upon fiduciary duty principles to deny Martin

Marietta's motion to enjoin a Bendix shareholder meeting that
had been called to adopt certain anti-takeover amendments.

Bendix had made

a

tender offer for Martin Marietta, who

responded by making

a

counter-offer for Bendix, and sought

the injunction to prevent Bendix from erecting new obstacles
to Martin Marietta's offer.

Because Bendix would obtain

a

majority of Martin Marietta's shares first, the Delaware
Supreme Court reasoned that Martin Marietta would owe

a

is in effect asking the Court

violation of

d.IX

1.

.

I

duty

"In seeking preliminary relief below, Martin

to Bendix:

[Marietta]

a

a

...

to assist it in

duty to its own majority shareholder, Ben-

I

.

However, as a practical matter, suits solely relying

upon common
not succeed.

lav;

claims of breach of fiduciary duty usually do

In Treadway Companies v.

Care

218
,

for example,

the target, Treadway, alleged that one of the target's direc-

tors was affiliated with the bidder, Care Corporation.

Treadway claimed that this director breached its fiduciary
duty to Treadway because he knew of Care's tender offer in

46

advance and, without disclosing that information to Treadway,
sold his 14 percent interest in Treadway to Care. 219

Likewise, in Hi-Shear v. Klaus

the Ninth Circuit held

,

that the target could not show irreparable injury and vacated
a

district court's order enjoining the tender offer.

The

target had alleged that the offer was based on confidential

proprietary information concerning the target and its financial prospects which the bidder had received from a former

target director. 221 The Ninth Circuit held that the target
"had not demonstrated, nor could it demonstrate, that it

would suffer injury not compensable by money damages from
[the former director's]

alleged breach of fiduciary duty,

assuming, but not deciding, that

a

breach had occurred." 222

Another impediment to fiduciary duty claims in tender
offer litigation is standing:

the duty allegedly violated

must extend to the plaintiff rather than some third party.
Thus in Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing

223
,

the bidder alleged that

an investment adviser allied with the target breached its

fiduciary duty to its clients by failing to vote proxies

received from those clients in favor of the bidder's slate of
directors.

The court dismissed the claim, stating that if

the investment advisor "has violated a duty, the cause of ac-

tion must be brought by one of its clients."
In the well-publicized Pennzoil

225

224

litigation, a Texas

state court jury awarded Pennzoil Co. $10.53 billion in

damages after finding that Texaco Inc. had improperly seized

ownership of Getty Oil Company from Pennzoil.

Op

C.

In December

47

1983, Pennzoil launched a $100 per share tender offer for 20

percent of Getty's stock.
voted to accept the offer.

In January 1984, the Getty board

Although Pennzoil acknowledged

that no formal documents were ever executed, it argued that
this favorable vote, a jointly prepared news release, some

handshakes and even
contract.

227

a

champagne toast, represented

a

binding

Getty apparently felt differently, and several

days later accepted a higher bid from Texaco.

attempt to block the resulting merger,

228

After

a

failed

Pennzoil filed suit

against Texaco for inducing Getty to breach its "contract"

with Pennzoil.

The Texas jury awarded Pennzoil the full

$7.53 billion in actual damages it sought, along with $3 billion in punitive damages and $470 million in interest.

229

On

December 10, 1985, Judge Soloman Casseb affirmed the verdiet.

230

...

.

Texaco then successfully applied for an injunction

to preclude a $12 billion appeal bond and to prevent Pennzoil

from enforcing the judgment while Texaco appeals.
H.

231

JUDICIAL CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATIONS BY THE BIDDER
The primary remedy available to targets is injunctive

relief.

However, absent incurable hindrances, such an

antitrust violations, courts generally will enjoin an offer
only temporarily, pending cure of all Williams Act violations.

In Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper

232
,

for example, the

Supreme Court held that the court of appeals erred in enjoining a prospective bidder from voting shares purchased during

the period that the bidder had failed to file a Schedule 13D.

The Court concluded that, because the prospective bidder

s

48

eventually filed

a

proper Schedule 13D, no basis for injunc-

tive relief existed.

Despite Rondeau'

holding that shareholder who sell "at

an unfairly depressed price have an adequate remedy by way of

an action for damages,

234

several district courts sub-

sequently imposed severe equitable sanctions on bidders, who

obtained shares by violating the Williams Act.

In Hanna

Mining v. Norcen Energy Resources 235 the court held that an
•

.

,

order requiring the bidder to divest all shares purchased

under

a

false Schedule 13D was warranted.

23

fi

Likewise, in

General Steel Industries v. Walco National Corp. 237 the
,

court ordered that the bidder "offer rescission to all
[target]

shareholders that sold in the open market during the

period of its noncompliance [with Section 13(d)] and that the
offer be enjoined pending the completion of that process." 2 3 8
Recently, however, courts have shied away from drastic
remedies.

In MacFadden Holdings v.J.B. Acquisition Corp.

239
,

for example, the Second Circuit reversed a district court's

injunction ordering

a

bidder to return shares tendered to it.

The district court had found that the tender offeror mis-

represented its intention to accept shares before obtaining
FCC approval.

The Second Circuit concluded that there had

been no misrepresentation.
The Fifth Circuit, in Gearhart Industries v. Smith In-

ternational 240 reversed the district court's preliminary in,

junction against

a

tender offer.

The lower court had en-

joined the tender offer to prevent the bidder from reaping

.

49

the benefits of the illegal "blocking position" it had

obtained by virtue of its failure to disclose its control
purpose in its original Schedule 13D.

The Fifth Circuit

rejected the lower court's reasoning and held that the injunction was "not justified." 241 Noting that

"

[t]he sole

purpose of the Williams Act is full and fair disclosure," the
court held that this purpose was satisfied when the bidder

amended its Schedule 13D to indicate its control purpose. 242
The court concluded that this amendment "cured any previous

violation of Section 13(d)

,

at least so far as to preclude

injunctive relief.""243
In Dan River v.

Icahn 244 the district court permitted
,

a

tender offer to proceed once the bidder's disclosure state-

ments were corrected, but ordered that the bidder's stock be
"sterilized,"

-

that is, prohibited from voting.

The court

sterilized both the shares that the bidder already owned and
the shares that the bidder was to purchase pursuant to the

offer.

The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that "the order

'sterilizing'

[the bidder's]

stock cannot be justified on the

basis of the insufficient disclosure alleged." 245 The court

emphasized that corrective disclosure is the normal remedy
for inadequate disclosure.

246

Noting that "the thrust of the

disclosure laws is to protect shareholders, not management,"
the court concluded:

"Manifestly, the 'sterilization' order

affords shareholders no more 'truthful and complete' information than that already provided by [the bidder]
filings

in its

50

Likewise, in San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real
Estate Investment Trust of America 248 the First Circuit held
,

that the district court should lift its preliminary injunc-

tion against a tender offer once the bidder makes "sufficient

disclosure

...

to equip

[the target's]

shareholders to make

a

decision." 249 Nonetheless, the First Circuit did not preclude
remedies beyond corrective disclosures.

endorsed as "sensible" the SEC

'

s

Indeed, the court

threefold test for determin-

ing whether additional relief is appropriate.

The SEC

'

s

test

asks the district court to consider "(1) whether a substantial number of shares were purchased after the misleading

disclosures and before corrective disclosure,

(2)

whether the

curative disclosure occurred simultaneously with or on the
eve of a tender offer, and

(3)

whether the violation was

egregious." 250 Moreover, the First Circuit specifically

recalled Judge Friendly'
Co.

v.

s

comment in Electronic Speciality

International Controls Corp

251
.

,

that "[i]f the court

believes the offeror has improperly depressed the price of
the stock before making the offer, it can require rescission
and enjoin further solicitation for a period...." 252

CHAPTER III
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF LITIGATION IN DEFEATING HOSTILE BIDS

A.

LITIGATION TO RESIST UNWANTED BIDS
Given that entrenched targets are moved by

a

variety of

tactical considerations to sue bidders, there remains the

question whether litigation actually helps targets to resist
hostile takeover bids.

For a variety of reasons, one must

conclude that it does.
First, whatever the specific reason for using a lawsuit

tactically in a control contest, 253 one thing seems clear:
the principal goal of litigious targets is to maintain the

company's independence.

Although litigation, like other

defensive measures, 254 often precedes
original or

a

a

higher offer by the

subsequent bidder, targets sue bidders

255"
primarily to thwart takeover attempts.

One simple measure

of the effectiveness of litigation as an anti-takeover

device, therefore, is the frequency with which litigious targets succeed in maintaining their control over the company

threatened by a hostile takeover.
Empirical studies suggest
litigating targets.

a

significant success rate for

For example, in his study of one hundred

litigious target defenses, Gregg Jarrell, ex-Chief Economist
of the Securities and Exchange Commission,

51

found that the

52

ore

target remained independent in twenty-one cases.

In

another empirical study, Michael Rosenzweig, 257 suggests that

litigation is the single most effective defense used by targets that successfully preserve their independence.

25 8

Based

on his analysis of a number of defeated hostile tender offers
in which the target remained independent for at least one

year, combined with stories on each tender offer in the Wall

Street Journal, Rosenzweig determined that target managers

employed defensive measures in forty-five of fifty-three
cases, thirty-nine of which included litigation against the

bidder. 259 In twenty-two of the thirty-nine cases, the

bidder's defeat was the result, directly or indirectly, of
relief granted by the court.

p c n

It thus appears that litigation helps targets fend off

hostile bids in

a

significant number of cases since no other

defensive measure has accounted for as many cases of successful target defense.

26

1

The question that arises consequently

is whether there is a sense in which litigation is an

"effective" defensive measure in cases in which the target
does not remain independent?
In one sense,

litigation is

a

potent anti-takeover

device even in contests that culminate in
trol.

offer.

a

change of con-

Litigation may be used to delay an unwanted tender
Delay, it turns out, correlates highly with

multiple-bid contests for targets.

In other words,

the

longer a tender offer is delayed, the more likely it is that

additional, higher bids for the target will emerge.

It

.

53

follows that targets may use litigation, in effect, to stimulate competitive bidding for the target's shares.

Provoking an auction is an effective means of resisting
an initial bid;

initial bidders usually fail to win control

of targets in multiple-bid contests.

264

But,

it is also true

that targets rarely remain independent once an auction
ensues:

empirical evidence suggests that there are few

multiple-bid contests among those tender offers in which the
pec

target is not ultimately taken over.

Thus, while litiga-

tion can help a target to retain control, in other cases it

may actually facilitate a change of control, albeit to

a

sequent bidder at a price higher than the initial offer.

subIn

these cases, obviously, litigation is not ultimately helpful
to entrenched targets.
It is also worth noting that,

not surprisingly,

shareholders of acquired firms fare significantly better in
auctions than in single-bid takeovers.

Jarrell,

for example,

concluded from his multi-method investigation of the returns
of shareholders from competing bids that "auctions are quite
£
lucrative for
targets
I

a-

II

266

Consequently, one might argue that target litigation is
laudable and the conclusion Jarrell draws from his study is
that:

"Target litigation [is] a strategic weapon that
benefits shareholders by delaying the execution of the
offending offer.
This delay increases the likelihood
that a higher offer will be made by the original bidder
or others ....

"

54
[L] itigating targets are very frequently the
beneficiaries of delayed auctions or improved bids by
The high frequency of these
the original suitors.
auctions and the large benefits they produce for target
shareholders dominate the foregone losses [sic] in the
cases where litigation helps to prevent takeovers....
.

.

.

This finding. .. suggests that most target litigation
should be viewed as a value-maximizing gamble undertaken by managers in the best interests of their
shareholders
.

The author, however, suggests that target litigation as
a

general matter is likely to be harmful to the interests of

target shareholders.

Even if there is an argument for

delaying tender offers and stimulating competitive auctions;
it does not follow that litigation is the best way to obtain

that delay.

Even if delay-induced bidding contests are

desirable, such delay can be accomplished more cheaply and

directly by means other than target litigation."
B.

LITIGATION AND THE BEST INTERESTS OF TARGET
SHAREHOLDERS?
Certain observations regarding takeover activity seems

beyond dispute.

First, shareholders of targets that are ac-

quired in tender offers generally realize substantial
gains.

269

Second, those gains are usually even greater if

the acquisition follows an auction for the target.

270

Third, certain forms of target management opposition to

takeover bids commonly elicit an auction; 271 notable among
these, of course, is litigation that succeeds in delaying an

initial bid.
Some commentators have concluded on the basis of these

observations that litigation is in the interests of

55

shareholders. 272 Others have responded that permitting
target managers to stimulate auctions is not, as a general
273
matter, in the best interests of target shareholders.

The latter commentators suggest that allowing managers to

elicit

a

bidding contest may raise the price received by

target shareholders ex-post, in

a

given transaction, but

only by raising the expense anticipated by a potential bidder ex-ante, thus reducing the number of expected wealth-

increasing bids.

274

However interesting and important it may be, the author
argues that one need not reach the auction question in order
to conclude that litigation is on balance harmful to target

shareholders.

Even if it is correct that opposition to

a

takeover bid may increase the wealth of target shareholders,
such argument ignores the implications of a target

management's serious conflict of interest and the substantial fact that some litigious target managements success-

fully maintain their control over the target and thereby

deprive their shareholders of substantial gains.

Empirical

studies show that the price of target shares generally falls
to its pre-offer level following an unsuccessful bid

275

and

some commentators thus concede that remaining independent by

thwarting

a

takeover attempt is never

for target shareholders.

27

a

beneficial outcome

fi

It is almost certain that the avoidance of takeovers by

litigious targets is not accidental; that, indeed, avoiding

takeover is the target management's goal in hostile takeover

a

56

threats.

First, a target management's interest in retaining

control over the target is
recognized.

powerful motive that must be

a

Second, the takeover defense literature suggests

that if any outcome of vigorous management opposition is
from a management's point of view

-

second best, it is

provoking an auction that results in
bid.

277

-

a

successful subsequent

Specialists advise target managers to use lawsuits in

order to resist takeover, even though they recognize that

sometimes resistant target managers will eventually lose to

different bidder or to
der.

278

a

a

higher offer from the initial bid-

Third, in cases that are not settled, target managers

almost always lose.

279

Most troubling for those proclaiming that target litigation is in the interests of the target shareholders is the

significant number of cases in which litigious managers actually preserve their control of the target.

28

The fact is

that managers by winning legal takeover battles forsake sub-

stantial premiums in cases in which auctions do not develop.
Only if one attributes to target managers the good faith

belief that remaining independent is beneficial for target

shareholders despite the substantial short-term gains that
are thereby sacrificed

2

81

-

an attribution that appears

plausible only if one ignores

a

target management's

self-interest in preserving control

-

is the proportion of

cases in which litigation thwarts takeovers consistent with
the "shareholder welfare theory of litigious defense."

282

In

summary, even if litigation is associated with auctions that

.

57

increase target shareholder returns, it is difficult to

believe that in the usual case target managers litigate with
the intention of provoking an auction.

Target managers sue

bidders hoping to defeat the bid; if their hopes are realized, the deleterious wealth effects for target shareholders

may be substantial.
This alone might suggest that litigation is too costly a

means of stimulating auctions and is not, therefore, in the

interests of target shareholders.

But the case for target

litigation seems even weaker when one examined more closely
the relationship between litigation and auctions.

Some com-

mentators argue that litigation stimulates auctions,

2 83

argu-

ing that target management opposition correlates with

competitive-bid contests.

This would assume that every tar-

get management opposition necessarily includes litigation and

would attribute the higher incidence of auctions in opposi'4.
tion cases to 4.U
the lawsuits.
4.

1

284

While indeed litigation is quite often included in

resistant management's defensive arsenal,

285

a

it appears

nearly impossible to know whether it is litigation,

resistance generally, or something else that provokes auctions.

A high frequency of competitive bid contests appear

to be associated with delay.

Such delay may be caused by

target litigation in particular or by target opposition in

general but one "cannot conclude ... that litigation is essential to the delay that correlates with a greater incidence of

auctions 287

58
C.

THE DESIRABILITY OF LITIGATION AS A MEANS OF DELAYING

TENDER OFFERS
Even if one assumes that litigation plays a role in

delaying tender offers and that delay is desirable because it
facilitates bidding contests, it does not follow that target
lawsuits offer a preferred method of securing such delay.

Litigation is very expensive.

Takeover specialists of-

ten cite the cost of defending against lawsuits as a virtue
of the litigation strategy.

288

However, if delay is

a

virtue,

it can be accomplished with a great deal less expense.

For

example, the Securities and Exchange Commission could
289
directly delay takeover bids by amending Rule 14e-l
to ex-

tend the required minimum period for tender offers beyond
a
twenty days.
4-

290

Some might oppose such an amendment, however, on the

ground that greater delay would not always benefit target
shareholders.

Thus, amending rule 14e-l also might increase

the risk and expense of all tender offers, possibly reducing
the incidence of value-increasing bids.

291

More specifically,

extended delay might disadvantage target shareholders in certain cases

-

for example, by scuttling the one bid that has

been made in circumstances in which additional bidders are

unlikely to emerge.

A possible virtue of litigation as a

source of delay is that target managers can refrain from
suing if that seems desirable.

Litigation, in other words,

affords target managers the ability to trigger delay or not,
as they deem appropriate.

59

This argument, however, ignores the implications of

a

target management's conflict of interest 292 and the empirical

evidence of litigation's potency as an anti-takeover
strategy.

293

.

.

Target litigation appears to be in some sense

gambling game;

a

lawsuit may delay an initial bid and provoke

a

an auction, but given the motives of litigious target

managers 294 and the role that litigation can play in defeating hostile bids, the risk that the lawsuit will instead

deprive target shareholders of
block

a

a

large premium and possibly

value-increasing redeployment of the target's

assets 295 is not neglectible.
This risk could be substantially reduced without fore-

going the perceived benefits of management-triggered delay by

adopting

a

rule that would give target managers discretion to

delay the consummation of

a

period, simply upon request.
a

tender offer for some specified
Rule 14e-l might be amended in

slightly different manner, for example, to permit target

managers to extend the minimum tender offer period on
showing that such
for the target.

296

a

delay might help them secure

a

a

higher bid

.

By comparison, a lawsuit against the bid-

der seems very costly, for it not only involves substantial

direct expense, but also carries with it the distinct possibility that

a

tender offer in the shareholder's interests

will be thwarted and that no competitive auction will emerge.
Thus, if a principal justification for target litigation is
its

(assumed)

role in delaying tender offers, that seems to

be scarcely any justification at all.

297

60

OTHER BENEFITS OF TARGET LITIGATION

D.

Commentators who support takeover defensive measures
sometimes argue that certain measures are justifiable attempts to prevent bidders from either "raiding"
or exploiting the "prisoner's dilemma"

fronts target shareholders.

299

29
8
"

the target

that often con-

These commentators claim that

litigation enables target managers to preclude bidders from

manipulating the prisoner's dilemma to gain control of the
target's assets for something less than their fair value and
that litigation therefore can be the most efficient means of
300
a
solving 4-u
the prisoner's dilemma.
i

•

•

t

•

i

The author disagrees.

The notion that bidders can gain

control of targets with value-decreasing offers 301 is inconsistent with

a

competitive acquisitions market; in theory

competition in the market for corporate control should
protect target shareholders from bids that are successful at
less than the best takeover price.

tends to support this hypothesis:

302

Empirical evidence

studies show that target

shares, including those that are not purchased by the bidder,

generally reflect significant capital gains as a result of
successful tender offers. 303 There appears to be no evidence
to support the claim that bidders acquire targets through

value-decreasing offers.
Some commentators have observed that competition among

potential bidders may not be sufficient to protect target
shareholders from value-decreasing acquisitions. 304 Essen.

.

.

tially, they note that the incentives of firms to compete in

61

the market for corporate control may be less than those that

typically operate in other competitive markets.

In most

markets, rents are competed away over time, and market actors
are induced to bid against one another in order to capture

these rents in the short term.

In the market for corporate

control, where competition generally involves a series of

revised bids,

a

potential competitor may be outbid without

ever having purchased any target shares, and therefore

without ever having captured any rents.

Since the result of

competition in the corporate control market may be to deprive
all competitors, and even the ultimate winner, of any of the

gains from acquiring control of the target, 305 the incentives
to compete may be significantly reduced, particularly given
"i

the nontrivial expense of revising a bid.

Of.

The above observations suggest that mechanics other than

competition may be required to protect target shareholders.
But of those that come to mind, allowing target managers to

litigate seems the least desirable, in part because of the

direct and indirect costs involved,

307

and in part because

litigation, unlike other defensive mechanisms one can
imagine, often imposes on target shareholders the wealth-

decreasing effects of remaining independent. 30 8
For example, one might solve the prisoner's dilemma by

adopting rules that allow target shareholders to tender
either "approvingly" or "disapprovingly" with success of the
bid dependent upon tender of a certain number of "approving"

tenders.

309

This would disable bidders from exploiting the
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pressures and distortions to which target shareholder decisions are currently subjected without preventing value --

increasing bids from reaching the shareholders. 310 Moreover,
the costs of such a mechanism would almost certainly be less
.

.

than those associated with target litigation.
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Alternatively, allowing target managers to make selftender offers in response to hostile bids would, if subject
to certain conditions,

facilitate the defeat of value-

decreasing bids without empowering managers to veto valueincreasing offers. 312 Again, this mechanism appears to
involve significantly less expense than litigation.
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In summary, even if one believes that the prisoner's

dilemma poses

a

real problem in takeover situations, that

does not appear to justify target litigation.

The presumed

benefits of litigation can be better and more cheaply ac-

complished through other means.
E.

314

THE SOCIAL COST OF TARGET LAWSUITS
The above paragraphs of this Chapter thus far have con-

sidered mainly the direct expense of litigation.

Arguably,

the more serious drawback to target lawsuits is the social

cost they can impose.
As a general proposition, competitive markets facilitate

the allocation of resources to their highest-valued uses.

Some commentators see takeover battles as

lustration of this principle.
offer as

a

a

particular il-

They view the hostile tender

transaction in the competitive market for cor-

porate control, in which managers of the bidding and target

63

firms vie for the right to control allocation of the target's
shares.

315

Under such

a

view, two conclusions follows:

(1)

an important function of takeover activity is to promote an

efficient allocation of corporate resources; and 92) that
function cannot be performed unless the competition between
the rival management teams is a fair one.

Target litigation can undermine this fair competition by

conferring

significant advantage on target managers in con-

a

trol contests with outside bidders.
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Significantly, no

safeguard prevents target managers from using litigation to
block value-increasing offers.

Thus,

self-interested

managers may sue in order to retain their control of the
target, even where

a

successful bid would plainly move the

target's assets to

a

higher-value use.
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Alternatively,

target managers may sue one bidder in order to facilitate an

inferior offer from

a

competing bidder who promises the

managers side payments or

a

more attractive deal.
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The

social cost of either result is substantial, for both produce

suboptimal allocation of the target's resources.

Requiring

target managers to comply with standards that would address
their conflict of interest might go
.

.

.

.

ing this cost.

a

long way toward reduc-
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In addition, maintaining the status quo with respect to

target litigation may impose
cost on society.

different, equally troubling

a

Litigious target managers have complex

motivations, but the management's self-interest in takeover
settings can be overwhelming.

3

21
''

For example, target managers

.

64

may convince themselves in good faith that preserving the

target's independence is in the best interests of its
shareholders.

322

Similarly, they may readily accept the

advice of lawyers to sue a bidder, without carefully

scrutinizing the merits of the legal claims they intend to
assert.
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In both cases,

the target managers' belief that

they are acting properly and in their shareholders'

may be mistaken, because they may be responding
some extent unknowingly

-

-

interests

even if to

to the understandably strong urge

to prevent their own ouster.

The law can play an important

role in this setting by reducing the likelihood that managers

will make such mistakes.

Conversely, there is significant

symbolic value in legal rules that permit or inadequately

discourage such conduct; managers may take comfort that
society, through its legal order, supports their decision to
324
resist takeovers through litigation.

The cost thus imposed by current law is substantial, not

only because it permits target managers to behave in a self-

regarding way, but also because it represents

a

missed oppor-

tunity to signal clearly to managers that society disfavors
325
self-interested behavior.
There may be other self-

interested corporate conduct that legal rules cannot as

effectively police.

3

"7 f\

Given the inherent limitations of

legal rules, the regulation of undesirable conduct that is

within the law's reach can be useful for communicating
society's disapproval to those who operate beyond the law's
compass 327
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Accordingly, quite apart from the harm that target

litigation can cause target shareholders and society by
impeding value-increasing takeovers, one should favor legal
rules that would respond to

a

management's conflict of inter-

est and reduce its temptation to sue bidders without care-

fully determining that a lawsuit is actually justified.

CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION:

PROPOSALS FOR REFORM

The courts have generally held that target managers are

entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule
when implementing takeover defensive measures; so long as

managers act in good faith and with a rational business purpose, resisting a hostile tender offer will not subject them
to liability for breach of their fiduciary obligations.

3 28

This general proposition has been applied to a number of

specific defensive responses 329 including target litigation.

330

Thus, existing legal rules encourage target lawsuits

by insulating litigious target managers from liability for

fiduciary breach.

Target shareholders who lose substantial

331
takeover premiums because of successful litigious defenses

have little recourse against their managers.
Some commentators have responded by arguing that target

management's conflict of interest in control contests should
preclude application of the business judgment rule and bar
some

332

or all

333

tators who mention target litigation

cussion

-

All of these commen-

takeover defenses.

without extended dis-

-

334
My analysis
claim that it should be prohibited.
.

.

leads me to be sympathetic with this conclusion:

litigation

by takeover targets can adversely affect target shareholder

66
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wealth

"

and significant social costs.

Accordingly, one

can readily understand why some would deny target managers

standing to assert claims against hostile bidders.

Nevertheless,

a

flat prohibition of target litigation

would be dangerously and needlessly radical.

Even assuming

that target managers are often inappropriate plaintiffs and
that manager-asserted claims frequently tend to be frivolous,

hostile bidders do sometimes violate the law and thereby inflict real harm on the target firm or its shareholders. 337
If one bars direct target actions against the bidder, who

will protect the target and its shareholders against truly
illegal conduct?

More broadly, if one eliminates targets as

plaintiffs, are there other private plaintiffs to help enforce the law?
One possible answer is to rely on actions by target

shareholders.

Shareholder litigation, however, is fraught

with problems of its own.
direct or derivative,
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First, shareholder action, whether

may involve conflicts that are at

least as intractable as those that infect actions by target

managers.

Because the law has responded to the "free-rider"

problem of shareholder litigation by permitting the recovery
of attorneys'

fees and expenses in actions that confer a

benefit on the corporations in question, 340 the incentive to
bring shareholder suits belongs more to the plaintiff's
lawyer than the plaintiff himself.

As a consequence, the

relevant private enforcer in shareholder actions is someone

whose interests may be adverse to the very shareholders he

.
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nominally represents. 341 Plaintiff's attorney, for example,
may be induced to accept collusive settlement of

effectively trades
award.

342

a

a

claim that

low corporate recovery for a high fee

....

Moreover, lawyers may find it in their interest to

assert frivolous claims entirely for their settlement
value 343
,

One may want to criticize target lawsuits partly on the

ground that target management's conflict of interest can
cause it to litigate principally for tactical reasons,

resulting in the frequent assertion of mortal claims against
bidders.

This would suggest that the lawyer, the real plain-

tiff in shareholder suits, is influenced by his own conflict
of interest and may also find the temptation to assert

frivolous claims irresistible.

As a result, one might

legitimately question whether shareholder actions represent
superior means of enforcing legal claims against bidders.
In addition,

a

a

344

rule barring target lawsuits but permit-

ting actions by target shareholders would cause unnecessary

conceptual strain.

For example, how, under such

a

rule,

would courts treat lawsuits in which the plaintiffshareholder is also an officer or director?

In certain such

cases, it may be obvious that the "shareholder" action is

a

spurious attempt to circumvent the rule barring management
suits,

345

but in other cases making that judgment would be

more difficult.
Similarly, it is not clear that

a

rule barring manage-

ment suits against bidders could effectively prevent managers
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from finding a third-party plaintiff to sue on their behalf.

However the rule might be phrased, it seems certain that some
covert system of signals would be available by which target

management could secure the services of a plaintiff's attorney or, perhaps more likely, an institutional law firm that

could find a group of shareholders to protect.
A more promising avenue of reform might be to continue
to permit target management suits, but to subject litigious

target managers to certain rules designed to mitigate their

self-interest.

One such solution,

for example, might be to

outlaw all defensive responses except litigation. 346 Under
such a regime, target lawsuits would be less useful tacti-

cally, since delay would no longer afford target managers the

opportunity to erect other barriers against takeover.
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Thus, reducing the tactical value of litigation might

decrease the incidence of meritless suits and also sig-

nificantly disable managers from successfully resisting

premium tender offers.

Moreover, this approach would

preserve the target's ability to prevent or redress truly
illegal conduct by bidders.

Moreover, this modified "rule of passivity"

349

would not

350
and
entirely eliminate the tactical value of litigation,

even if it did, such a rule seems an "increasingly futile

hope."

351

Moreover, it could in fact backfire.

...

If litigation

were the only tactic that target management could invoke to
thwart tender offers, more barely colorable lawsuits might be

.

.
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brought for want of other options.

A less extreme solution

may therefore hold greater promise.
For instance, target managers who sue hostile bidders

could be denied the protections of the business judgment rule
and instead be required to demonstrate the compelling busi-

ness purpose of their lawsuits.

352

This more stringent stand-

ard would discourage target managers from suing reflexively
in an effort to thwart unwanted tender offers.

As with the

modified passivity rule mentioned above, the result might be
to reduce the likelihood of both frivolous litigation and the

defeat of value-increasing bids.

And, again, under this ap-

proach managers could still pursue bona fide legal claims
against bidders.

Nevertheless, courts have only recently begun to consider abandonment of the business judgment rule as the proper

standard for evaluating takeover defensive measures.
cordingly, at least until the courts demonstrate

willingness to subject defensive measures to
test,

a

a

353

Ac-

greater

more rigorous

it may make sense to consider other alternatives as

well
One broad response to target management's conflict of

interest is suggested by Professor Coffee in his article on
this issue.

354
"

His proposal, to compensate terminated

355
managers through the use of "golden parachutes," " would

plainly reduce management's incentive to resist hostile
takeovers

.
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Professor Coffee's proposal is appealing, not least because it seeks to abate target management's conflict of in-

terest through positive rather than negative incentives.
But Coffee himself recognizes that the optimal response to

target management's urge to resist hostile bids is to temper
the management's self-interest through negative and positive

incentives 357
In response to all of the foregoing two proposals emerge.

First, and most basically, one could impose cash

penalties on target managers who assert frivolous claims.
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 358 already

authorizes courts to sanction lawyers who sign pleadings or

motions that are without merit or interposed for an improper
purpose such as harassment or delay. 359 Enforcing

similar

a

rule against target managers themselves might significantly

alter their strategic calculus and thereby reduce their in-

centive to sue bidders for merely tactical reasons.
result, arguably, would be

litigation and

a

a

3

fi f)

The

decrease in groundless target

declining use of lawsuits to resist value

increasing bids.

Alternatively, in recognition of the target management's
conflict of interest, managers might be required initially to
finance target lawsuits out of their own funds, with

reimbursement or indemnification available from the target

corporation upon

a

showing that the lawsuit was warranted.

Of course, what all these proposals share in common is

their skeptical attitude toward target litigation:

all,

in
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one way or another, would treat target lawsuits with greater

suspicion than actions brought by other plaintiffs.

In the

final analysis, taking this view of target litigation is more

important than agreement on one proposal or another.

Cur-

rently, the costs of target lawsuits far outweigh their

benefits, principally because of the conflict of interest
that influences target managers.

would blunt

a

Tempering that conflict

costly takeover defense while preserving a

valuable means of asserting meritorious legal claims against
bidders.

Ultimately, this would benefit not only target

shareholders, but also society at large.

.

NOTES

1.

Adapted from 1 M. Lipton
Freezouts (1986)

2.

For a discussion of target lawsuits and their legal
bases, see Chapter II infra

&

E.

Steinberger, Takeovers

&
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"It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the
mails or by any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors to solicit or to permit
the use of his name to solicit any proxy or consent or
authorization in respect of any security (other than
an exempted security) registered pursuant to section 12
of this title."
15 U.S. C. §78n (a) (1984).
2b. 15 U.S.C. §578m (d)-(e), 78 n (d)-(f) (1984).
2a.

2c.

"(1) Any person who, after acquiring directly or
indirectly the beneficial ownership of any equity
security of a class which is registered pursuant to
section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an
insurance company which would have been required to be
so registered except for the exemption contained in
section 12(g) (2) (G) of this title, or any equity
security issued by a closed-end investment company
registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
is directly or indirectly the beneficial owner of more
than 5 per centum of such class shall, within ten days
after such acquisition, send to the issuer of the
security at its principal executive office, by registered or certified mail, send to each exchange where
the security is traded, and file with the Commission,
a statement containing such of the following information, and such additional information, as the Commission
may by rules and regulations, prescribe as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors:
(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the nature of such beneficial ownership by,
such person and all other persons by whom or on whose
behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
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the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to be used in making the purchases,
and if any part of the purchase price is represented
or is to be represented by funds or other consideration borrowed or otherwise obtained for the purpose of
acquiring, holding, or trading such security, a description of the transaction and the names of the parties
thereto, except that where a source of funds is a loan
made in the ordinary course of business by a bank, as
defined in section 3(a) (6) of this title, if the person
filing such statement so requests, the name of the bank
shall not be made available to the public;
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire control of the business of the
issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals which
such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell
its assets to or merge it with any other persons, or to
make any other major change in its business or corporate
structure.
(D) the number of shares of such security which are
beneficially owned, and the number of shares concerning
which there is a right to acquire, directly or indirectly, by (i) such person, and (ii) by each associate
of such person, giving the background, identity,
residence, and citizenship of each such associate; and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with any person with respect to any
securities of the issuer, including but not limited to
transfer of any of the securities, joint ventures, loan
or option arrangements, puts or calls, guaranties of
loans, guaranties against loss or guaranties of profits,
division of losses or profits, or the giving or withholding of proxies, naming the persons with whom such contracts, arrangements, or understandings have been entered
into, and giving the details thereof.
(B)

(2) If any material change occurs in the facts set forth
in the statements to the issuer and the exchange, and in
the statement filed with the Commission, an amendment
shall be transmitted to the issuer and the exchange and
shall be filed with the Commission, in accordance with
such rules and regulations as the Commission may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.

When two or more persons act as a partnership,
(3)
limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding, or disposing of securities
of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a
"person" for the purposes of this subsection.

.
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In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any
(4)
percentage of a class of any security, such class shall
be deemed to consist of the amount of the outstanding
securities of such class, exclusive of any securities of
such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a
subsidiary of the issuer.

The Commission, by rule or regulation or by order,
(5)
may permit any person to file in lieu of the statement
required by paragraph (1) of this subsection or the rules
and regulations thereunder, a notice stating the name of
such person, the number of shares of any equity
securities subject to paragraph (1) which are owned by
him, the date of their acquisition and such other information as the Commission may specify, if it appears to
the Commission that such securities were acquired by such
person in the ordinary course of his business and were
not acquired for the purpose of and do not have the effect of changing or influencing the control of the issuer
nor in connection with or as a participant having such
purpose or effect.
(6)

The provisions of this subsection shall not apply

to:
(A) any acquisition or offer to acquire securities made
or proposed to be made by means of a registration statement under the Securities Act of 1933;
(B) any acquisition of the beneficial ownership of a
security which, together with all other acquisitions by
the same person of securities of the same class during
the preceding twelve months, does not exceed 2 per centum
of that class;
(C) any acquisition of an equity security by the issuer
of such security;
(D) any acquisition or proposed acquisition of a security
which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by order, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection
as not entered into for the purpose of, and not having
the effect of, changing or influencing the control of the
issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the purposes of this subsection." 15 U.S.C. §78m (d)

"(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of the mails or by means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities exchange or otherwise, to make a tender
offer for, or a request or invitation for tenders of, any
class of any equity security which is registered pursuant
to section 12 of this title, or any equity security of an
insurance company which would have been required to be so
registered except for the exemption contained in section
12(g) (2) (G) of this title, or any equity security issued
by a closed-end investment company registered under the
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Investment Company Act of 1940, if, after consummation
thereof, such person would, directly or indirectly, be
the beneficial owner of more than 5 per centum of such
class, unless at the time copies of the offer or request
or invitation are first published or sent or given to
security holders such person has filed with the Commission a statement containing such of the information
specified in section 13(d) of this title, and such additional information as the Commission may by rules and
regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. All
requests or invitations for tenders or advertisements
making a tender offer or requesting or inviting tenders
of such a security shall be filed as a part of such
statement and shall contain such of the information contained in such statement as the Commission may by rules
and regulations prescribe.
Copies of any additional
material soliciting or requesting such tender offers subsequent to the initial solicitation or request shall contain such information as the Commission may by rules and
regulations prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors, and
shall be filed with the Commission not later than the
time copies of such material are first published or sent
or given to security holders.
Copies of all statements,
in the form in which such material is furnished to
security holders and the Commission, shall be sent to the
issuer not later than the date such material is first
published or sent or given to any security holders.
(2) When two or more persons act as a partnership,
limited partnership, syndicate, or other group for the
purpose of acquiring, holding or disposing of securities
of an issuer, such syndicate or group shall be deemed a
"person" for purposes of this subsection.
(3) In determining, for purposes of this subsection, any
percentage of a class of any security, such class shall
be deemed to consist of the amount of outstanding
securities of such class, exclusive of any securities or
such class held by or for the account of the issuer or a
subsidiary of the issuer.

(4) Any solicitation or recommendation to the holders of
such a security to accept or reject a tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders shall be made in accordance with such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.
(5) Securities deposited pursuant to a tender offer or
request or invitation for tenders may be withdrawn by or
on behalf of the depositor at any time until the
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expiration of seven days after the time definitive copies
of the offer or request or invitation are first published
or sent or given to security holders, and at any time
after sixty days from the date of the original tender offer or request or invitation, except as the Commission
may otherwise prescribe by rules, regulations, or order
as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for
the protection of investors.
(6) Where any person makes a tender offer, or request or
invitation for tenders, for less than all the outstanding
equity securities of a class, and where a greater number
of securities is deposited pursuant thereto within ten
days after copies of the offer or request or invitation
are first published or sent or given to security holders
than such person is bound or willing to take up and pay
for, the securities taken up shall be taken up as nearly
as may be pro rata, disregarding fractions, according to
the number of securities deposited by each depositor.
The provisions of this subsection shall also apply to
securities deposited within ten days after notice of an
increase in the consideration offered to security
holders, as described in paragraph (7)
is first published or sent or given to security holders.
,

(7) Where any person varies the terms of a tender offer
or request or invitation for tenders before the expiration thereof by increasing the consideration offered to
holders of such securities, such person shall pay the increased consideration to each security holder whose
securities are taken up and paid for pursuant to the
tender offer or request or invitation for tenders whether
or not such securities have been taken up by such person
before the variation of the tender offer or request or

invitation.
(8) The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to
any offer for, or request or invitation for tenders of,
any security:
(A) if the acquisition of such security, together with
all other acquisitions by the same person of securities
of the same class during the preceding twelve months,
would not exceed 2 per centum of that class;
(B) by the issuer of such security; or
(C) which the Commission, by rules or regulations or by
order, shall exempt from the provisions of this subsection as not entered into for the purpose of, and not
having the effect of, changing or influencing the control
of the issuer or otherwise as not comprehended within the
purposes of this subsection." 15 U.S.C. §78n (d) (1984).
"It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or omit to state any
material fact necessary in order to make the statements

.

78

made, in the light of the circumstances under which they
are made, not misleading or to engage in any fraudulent,
deceptive, or manipulative acts or practices, in connection with any tender offer or request or invitation for
tenders, or any solicitation of security holders in opposition to or in favor of any such offer, request, or
The Commission shall, for the purposes of
invitation.
this subsection, by rules and regulations define, and
prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative."
15 U.S.C. §78n (e) (1984).
For a discussion of target lawsuits under the federal
securities law disclosure and reporting requirements, see
Chapter II, Paragraph C, infra
2d MacFadden Holding, Inc. v. JB Acquisition Corp.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., paragraph 92,439 at 94,588
(2d Cir. Aug. 8, 1986).
SEC v. World Wide Comm. Investments, Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 754 (N.D. Ga 1983),
citing Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
.

.

2e.

The Securities and Exchange Commission has amended Rule
14e-l, 17 C.F.R. §240, 14C-1, to provide that a tender
offer must remain open for 10 business days after the announcement of an increase in the amount of securities
being sought by the bidder.
See Exchange Act Release No.
paragraph
22791, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
In addition, the SEC adopted a
83,955 (Jan. 14, 1986).
new rule, Rule 14d-10, to make explicit that in thirdparty tender offers the bidder's offer must (i) be open
to all holders of the class of securities subject to the
tender offer and (ii) provide that all security holders
be offered to the highest consideration offered to any
security holder.
Rule 13e-4, governing issuer tender offers, was similarly amended.
Exchange Act Release No.
23,421B [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., paragraph 84,016
(Sept. 4, 1986).
Finally, the SEC has issued a Concept
Release seeking public comment on whether the Williams
Act should apply when a person acquires a "substantial"
percentage of a target company's stock during or just
after a tender offer.
Exchange Act Release No. 23486,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., paragraph 84,018 (Julv 31,
,

1986)
2f.

See generally Cherno, Tactical Litigation Problems in
Tender Offers ALI-ABA New Dimensions in Securities
Litigation:
Planning and Strategies (Boston, June 2-3,
,

1983)

.

2g.

15 U.S.C. §78n (d)(1) (1984); Rule 14 d-3, 17 C.F.R.
§240.14 d-3 (1984); 17 C.F.R. §240, 14 d-100 (1984).

2h.

17 C.F.R. §240.14 d-100 (1984).
See also SEC Release No.
34-13,787, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.

.

.

.

.

79

paragraph 81,256 at 88,379-80 (1977).
Rep. (CCH)
"Safe
harbor" provisions, under which certain types of financial information are deemed to comply with the requirement of Item 9.
,

2i.

See Schedule 14 D-l, Item 10, requiring material information as to the applicable regulatory requirements that
must be complied with, or approvals that must be obtained, in connection with the bid, to the extent known
by the bidder after reasonable investigation.

2j

Such information is expressly required by Schedule
14 D-l, Item 3.
Item 10(a) also calls for data of this
nature

.

2k.

See Schedule 14 D-l,

21.

17 C.F.R.

2m.

E.g.

Item

§240.10 b-13

4.

(1984).

Items 2(e) and (f) of Schedule 14 D-l require disclosure of criminal conviction and certain injunctions
involving the bidder.
17 C.F.R. §14 d-100 (1984).
See
generally Branch & Rubright, Integrity of Management Disclosures under the Federal Securities Laws 3 7 Bus. Law
,

,

1447
2n.

(1982)

U.S.C. §18 (1984).
Section 7 provides in relevant part:
"No person .... shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock
and no person
shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of
another person
where
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to
tend to create a monopoly."
For a discussion of target lawsuits under the federal antitrust laws, see Chapter II, Paragraph E.l infra
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

2o.

15 U.S.C.

§15

(1984)

2p.

15 U.S.C.

§26

(1984)

2q.

15 U.S.C. §78g(f) (1984).
For a discussion of target lawsuits under the federal
margin regulations, see Chapter II, Paragraph E.2, infra
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2r.

12 C.F.R.
12 C.F.R.

§221.1 (a)
§221. 3(v)

"Margin stock" is defined in
(1984).
(1984) as "50% of the current market
value, as determined by any reasonable method."

2s.

12 C.F.R.

§224.2

2t.

18 U.S.C. §§1961-68 (1984).
For a discussion of target lawsuits under RICO, see
Chapter II, Paragraph E.3 infra

(1984)
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2u.

18 U.S.C.

2v.

For a discussion of target lawsuits under state takeover
statutes and regulatory statutes, see Chapter II,
Paragraphs 1 and 2 infra

§1962.

.

2w.

For a discussion of target lawsuits under common law, see
Chapter II, Paragraph G infra
.

3.

San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real
See
e.g.
Estate Investment Trust of America, 701 F.2d 1000, 1003
(1st Cir. 1983) (court notes that the congressional
policy underlying Williams Act "is frustrated by
unjustifiably delaying tender offers").
See generally
Chapter II Infra
,

,

,

.

4.

See e.g.
Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcess Energy Resources
Ltd., [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. Rep. (CCH)
paras. 98, 878 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).

5.

Wander and LeCogue, Boardroom Jitters:
See e.g.
Corporate Control Transactions and Today's Business
Judgment Rule 42 Bus. Law 29 (1986); Lipton Takeover
Bids in the Target's Boardroom 3 5 Bus. Law 101
(1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom An Update After One Year 36 Bus. Law. 1017
(1981); Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate
Directors Have Right to Resist Tender Offers 3 Corp.
L. Rev. 107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the
Target's Boardroom:
A Response to Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel 5 5 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1231 (1980)
see als o authorities cited at note 328 infra
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6.

While the author believes that his approach to management resistance expressed in this essay is respectable
and appropriate in today's economic perspective, and
finds support with certain commentators, the author has
noted that the academic community has developed
approaches which are different from the author's.
Professors Easterbook and Fischel have argued for a rule
of managerial passivity under which management of a
target company could take no action either to resist a
bid, to buy back shares of the target offered to it by a
potential bidder or, to seek another friendly bidder to
make a counter bid.
See Easterbrook & Fischel The
Proper Role of a Targets Management in Responding to a
Easterbrook &
Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161 (1981)
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions 91 Yale L. J.
Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk
698 (1982)
These
Costs and Tender Offers 35 Stan. L. Rev. (1982)
challenging articles have drawn a critical response from
those who share the fundamental economic premises as do
Professors Esaterbrook and Fischel and those who do not.
,

;

,

;

,

.

;

81

For responses written from a basically similar economic
perspective, see Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating
Competing Tender Offers 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1028 (1982)
Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender
35 Stan. L. Rev. 23
Offers;
A Reply and Extension
(1982); Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark
Repellents, and Takeout Mergers:
The Case Against
Fiduciary Duties 1983 A.B.F. Research J. 341; Gilson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers 33 Stan. L. Rev. 819
Gilson The Case Against Shark Repellent
(1981)
Amendments:
Structural Limitations on the Enabling
Concept 34 Stan. L. Rev. 775 (1982)
Gilson, Seeking
Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer
Defense 35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1982)
For other writers
that have criticized the position of Professors
Easterbrook and Fischel from the vantage point that
shares few of their premises, see Lipton, Takeover Bids
in the Target's Boardroom
35 Bus. Law. 101 (1979);
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom:
An
Update After One Year 36 Bus. Law 1017 (1980)
Lipton,
Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom: A Response to
Professors Easterbrook and Fischel 5 5 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1231
(1980); Lowenstein, Prunning Deadwood in Hostile
Takeovers: A Proposal for Legislation 83 Colum. L. Rev.
249 (1983).
See also Coffee, Regulating the Market for
Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of Tender
Offer's Role in Corporate Governance 84 Colum. L.
Rev. 1145, 1152 (1984); Coffee, Shareholders Versus
Managers:
The Strain in the Corporate Web 85 Mich. L.
Rev. 1 (1986).
Essentially, Lucian Bebchuck and Professor Gilson concur with Professors Easterbrook and
Fischel as to the illegitimacy of defensive tactics which
seek to maintain the target corporation as anindependent
entity.
However, both Bebchuck and Gilson believe that
greater allocational efficiency results if target
In
management is permitted to facilitate competing bids.
contrast, Professor Lowenstein and Martin Lipton have
argued that it is desirable that target management be
able to resist the takeover, although in Professor
Lowenstein s proposal the authorized scope of resistance
would be limited and would be principally intended to
give shareholders a more informed, or less pressured
choice.
Lowenstein, supra at 322-33.
Of all these
commentators only Martin Lipton takes the view that the
normal business judgment discretion accorded to the board
of directors in other areas of corporate law should
See
extend to the context of corporate control contests.
Lipton, supra at 113-20.
However, Professor Carney
approaches the same result by conceptualizing the
takeover contest as one between the bidder and the target
shareholders, in which management of the target is
serving as the faithful agent of its shareholders in
,
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seeking to obtain a higher price for their shares.
Carney, supra at 322-33..
,

7.

But See
Gilson, supra note 5, at 826-31.
Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock Repurchases 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1377 (1986) (providing extended analysis
of one defensive tactic, target stock repurchases).
See

e.g.

,

Bradley

8.

,

&

,

Some commentators, for example, almost usually lump
target litigation together with other takeover defenses
they would simply bar as inimical to shareholder
welfare

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5 at
See e.g.
1192-94; see also Gibson, supra note 5 at 878-79.
In a recent article, however, the impact of target
litigation on the wealth of target shareholders has
Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of
been examined.
Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge ? 28 J.L. & Econ. 131 (1985).
,

9.

10.

,

See Chapter III infra
I.

M.

Lipton

&

E.

.

Stinberger, Takeovers

&

Freezeouts,

(1986); S. Lome, Acquisitions and Mergers:
Negotiated and Contested Transactions, §4.05 [3] [b] [i]
Defenses,
(1985); I. A. Fleisher, Tender Offers:
Responses, and Planning 119-44 (2d ed 1983 & Supp.
1985); E. Aranow, H. Einhorne & G. Berlstein, Developments in Tender Offers for Corporate Control 10492 (1977)
E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, Tender Offers for
Corporate Control 266-67 (1973)

§6.07

.

;

.

11.

See Rosenzweig, Target Litigation
110, 112 (1986).

12.

See notes 13 and 15-17 infra

13.

Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics
Bus. Law 1433, 1437 (1977).

14.

Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. §§78m (d)-(e), 78n (d)-(f)

,

85 Mich.

L.

Rev.

.

,

32

(1982)
15.

Liman, Has the Tender Movement Gone Too Far?
Sch. L. Rev. 687, 688 (1978).

16.

Id.

at 689.

17.

Id.

at 696-97.

18.

Arthur, Kirby & Rein, Defamation Suits as
Corporate Control Battles 37 Bus. Law. 1
,

a

,

23 N.Y.L.

Weapon in
The

(1981).
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authors deny the increased tendency of courts to hold
that "state securities statutes are preempted by
federal securities laws" and to read "federal
securities and antitrust statutes less expansively,"
concluding that "participants in heated control battles
have good reason to consider new litigation
alternatives, including defamation actions." J_d. at 3.
They note, for instance, that " [i]n corporate control
battles, initiation of litigation often is motivated as
much by short term or tactical considerations as by the
prospects of long-term relief on the merits." I_d. at
Thus, they point out that "[a]lmost any plausible
8.
cause of action threatens [the] opponent with burden,
delay, and expense," which they applaud as "a valuable
means of enhancing an opponent's apparent level of
risk."
Id. at 11.
Similarly, they extol the tactical
value of "expedited and wide-ranging discovery" in
takeover litigation, observing that quite apart from
its relevance to the merits of the care, discovery "may
provide insight into an opponent's tactics and useful
'ammunition' in the form of unfavorable information,
and also may burden an opponent at a time of otherwise
intense demands." Id. at 10.
19.

Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of
Tender Offers 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155, 1155 (1982).
,

20.

Jennings & H. Marsh, Securities Regulation 671 (5th
The omitted footnote is
1982) (footnote omitted).
worth quoting in its entirety:
"In reading some of the
cases, one has the feeling that the complaint may have
been drafted in advance with the name of the defendant
left blank, to be filled in as the occasion may
require."
I_d. at 671, n.l; see also R. Gilson, The Law
and Finance of Corporate Acquisitions 642 (1986) ("The
single most common response to an unwanted offer is
litigation."); Cohn Tender Offers and the Sale of
Control:
An Analogue to Determine the Validity of
Target Management Defensive Measures 66 Iowa L. Rev.
475, 487 (1981) ("Immediate initiation of litigation
seeking a preliminary injunction against the tender
offer proceeding has been almost a knee-jerk reaction
in hostile takeover situations."); H. Kripke, The SEC
and Corporate Disclosure:
Regulation in Search of a
Purpose 270 (1979) (describing tender offer litigation
as "necessarily a game, a series of litigation tactics
with teams ready to fly into action at the first sign
of a tender of fer, ... [where] the concept of law as a
system of justice is completely irrelevant").
R.

ed.

,

,

21.

Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets:
Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?
28 J. L. & Econ.
,
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151,
n.

160-61

(1985);

Rosenzweig, supra note 501, 14

17.

22.

See note 12 supra

.

23.

See note 24 infra

.

24.

This, however, may be changing as target managers
resort with increasing frequency to so-called
structural defenses such as recapitalization, stock
repurchases, and asset sales.
See Coffee, Shareholders
Versus Managers; The Strain in the Corporate Web 8 5
Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6-7, 43-44, 52-60 (1986); see also
note 25 infra (noting the observation of some
takeover lawyers that targets are relying less on
litigation as a defensive measure)
It is also worth
noting that some specialists are careful to counsel
target managers who do sue to assert only meritorious,
bona fide claims.
While these specialists recognize
the tactical value of litigation, they clearly reject
the use of litigation for purely tactical reasons.
See e.g.
Fleisher, Tender Offers:
1 A.
Defenses,
Responses, and Planning 229 and note 22 (2d ed
1983
and Supp. 1985); Reuben & Elden, How to be a Target
Company 23 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 423, 437-38 (1978).
,

.

,

,

.

,

25.

See generally

26.

See e.g.
American Gen. Corp. v. NLT Corp., [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
paragraphs
98, 806 at 94,142 (S.D. Tex. July 1, 1982); Marshall
Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 5 27 F. Supp. 86, 9 9
(E.D.N.Y.), affd
665 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1981); CrouseHinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 518 F. Supp. 416, 456
(N.D.N.Y. 1980)
D-2 Investment Co. v. Holloway,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH),
paragraphs 94,771 at 96,562 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Electronic
Speciality Co. v. International Control Corp., 409 F.2d
See also note 27 infra and
937, 947 (2d Cir. 1969).
accompanying text.
,

A.

1

Fleisher, supra note 24, at 289-99.

,

,

.

,

;

27.

Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47,
1985) ("Although we should not hesitate to
enforce the [Williams] Act's disclosure provisions
through appropriate relief, we must also guard against
improvident or precipitous use of remedies that may
have the effect of favoring one side or the other in a
takeover battle when allegations of violation of the
Act, often made in the heat of the contest, may not be
substantiated.
In this context, the preliminary
injunction, which is one of the most drastic tools in
See

,

60

(2d Cir.

e.g.

,
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the arsenals of judicial remedies, must be used with
great care, lest the forces of the free market place,
which in the end should determine the merits of
takeover disputes, are nullified."); Norlin Corpo. v.
Rooney, Pace, Inc. 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984)
("Developments in corporate control contests often
proceed swiftly, and timing may have a crucial impact
on the outcome.... [T]he courts themselves are too often
drawn into the fray... [I] t is not for us to make the
policy choices that will determine whether this style
of corporate warfare will excalate or diminish.");
Gearhart Indus, v. Smith Intl., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th
Cir. 1984) (refusing to grant target preliminary
injunction in part because of reluctance "to provide a
weapon for management to discourage takeover bids or
prevent large accumulation of stock which would create
the potential for such attempts") (quoting Rondean v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 58 (1975)); Liberty
Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v. Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545,
566 (11th Cir. 1984) ("To permit the [target to sue the
bidder] simply because [the bidder] made a false filing
would tip the balance towards [target] management,
thereby injuring the existing investors ... .The threat
of this sort of litigation might remove from the field
a player whose self-interest is to monitor management,
and who is poised to mount a proxy fight or a tender
offer."); Seilon, Inc. v. Lamb, [1983-1984 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
paragraphs 99,448, at
96,549-51 (N.D. Ohio 1983)
" [E] xtending standing to
the [target] brings with it grave risks to the
shareholders and their interests.
By allowing
managment to sue in the corporation's name, some delay
in the ultimate resolution of the dispute between
incumbents and challengers will always occur .... [D] elay
favors embattled management.
Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, management can use the corporation's
assets as its armory against the takeover campaign.
In
many, if not most, instances this opportunity will be
exploited for the benefit of management, and to the
detriment of the shareholder's equity and investment.... Any attempt to expand [Williams Act] litigation
must be strenuously resisted, else the judiciary find
itself unwillingly furthering the destruction of vital
shareholder interests."); Equity Oil Co. v.
Consolidated Oil & Gas, 596 F. Supp. 507, 511, 514 (D.
Utah 1983) ("A private cause of action [under section
13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934] for
injunctive relief in the hands of [target] management
would tip the balance in its favor, providing a
powerful weapon for delay and perhaps defeat of a
takeover attempt ... .The [Williams Act] was designed to
maintain neutrality in takeover attempts [and
therefore] does not support [such] an implied right of
,

(

.
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action. .. .As soon as Schedule 13D is filed, entrenched
management can use a suit for an injunction, with
voluminous discovery requests, for its delay value to
defeat any takeover attempt, regardless of the merits
of the case."); Marshall Field & Co. v. Icahn, 537 F.
Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) " [L] itigation can be
misused by management for self-perpetuation in a manner
which is contrary to the interest and welfare of their
stockholders."); Standard Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503
F. Supp. 586, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("To grant a preliminary injunction under [these] circumstances would
unfairly provide [target] management with a weapon to
discourage takeover bids, contrary to the purpose of
Section 13(d)."); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 490 F.
638 F.2d
Supp. 660, 664, 666 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), modified
357 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The [Williams Act] was not intended
to be used as a device by which incumbent management
defends itself against a takeover bid... [T] he Court
does not believe that [target management] is the most
appropriate party to maintain this suit in view of its
interest (be it paramount or not) in retaining
corporate control, an interest that does not
necessarily coincide with the interests of the
shareholders "
(

,

.

)

notes 26-27 supra and accompanying text.

28.

Cf.

29.

See e.g.
I. A. Fleischer, supra note 24, at 298
(arguing that "[a]t this time, courts appear generally
unsympathetic - they are skeptical about target claims
and relunctant to obstruct premium offers and free
market dynamics"); Hertsberg, Takeover Targets Find
Loading Up on Debt Can Fend Off Raiders Wall St. J.,
Sept. 10, 1985, at 1, col. 6 (arguing that "[t]he
period of the litigation defense is gone" (quoting
Martin Lipton) and that " [t]he courts will intervene
s much more sparing use of
on occasion, but there
their power" (quoting Arthur Fleischer, Jr.)).
,

,

,

'

30.

See Chapter III infra

31.

Jensen & Ruback The Market for CorSee e.g.
11 J.
porate Control;
The Scientific Evidence
In other words, managers
Fin. Econ. 5, 31 (1983).
may have training and skills that are peculiarly
If these managers lose
suited to the target firm.
their jobs, they may therefore be unable to secure
new positions at the same level of prestige and
compensation.
,

.

,

,

,

32.

Fleischer, supra note 24, at 257-64;
Steinberger, Takeovers & Freezeouts,
(1986); E. Aranow & H. Einhorn & G. Berlstein,

See generally
1
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§609

Lipton
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E.

A.
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,

,

,
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Negotiated
(1977); S. Lome, Acquisitions and Mergers:
and Contested Transactions, §4 05 [3] [6] [i] (1985);
Cherno & Sussman, Tender-Offer Litigation Litigation,
Winter 1984, at 41, 44.
.

,

33.

15 U.S.C.

34.

See generally Chapter II infra

35.

Rosenzweig, supra note 11, at 122.

36.

This is not true, however, where the grant of preliminary injunctive relief is based onillegal conduct that
is readily curable, such as violations of certain
See e.g.
disclosure requirements.
Treadway Cos. v.
Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
In such cases,
the bidder can often remedy the disclosure problem and
proceed with the offer without much (if any) delay
beyond the time periods prescirbed by federal tender
offer rules.
See e.g.
Pacific Realty Trust v. APC
Invs., Inc., 685 F.2d 1083 (9th Cir. 1982); Chromalloy
Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir.
But see Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp.
1979)
[1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
paragraph 93,058 (D. Haw. 1986) (granting preliminary
injunction due to inadequacy of corrective disclosure;
MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v. J.B. Acquisition Corp.
(1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., paragraph
92,856 at 94,168-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) finding corrective
disclosure and withdrawal inadequate in case of
revd
"deliberate" and "blatant" misrepresentation)
802 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1986). (finding tender offer
materials not misleading.).

,

§18

(1986)

.

,

,

.

,

,

.

(

,

37.

.

See e.g.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill,
Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.), cert, denied
419
U.S. 883 (1974)
,

,

,

.

38.

e.g.
Rondean v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49,
57 (1975); E.H.I, of Fla., Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N.
Am., 652 F.2d 310, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1981); Los Angeles

See

,

,

Memorial Coliseum Commn. v. National Football League,
634 F.2d 1197, 1200-01 (9th Cir. 1980).
A few courts
have fashioned a rather liberal standard.
In the Second
Circuit, for example, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary
injunction must show irreparable harm and either (1) a
likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently
serious questions going to the merits to make them a
fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships
tipping decidedly in the plaintiff's favor.
See e.g.
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240,
,

244

(8th Cir.

1979)

,

.
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Rosenzweig, supra note 11, at 123.

40.

SEC Rule 14e-l,

41.

Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., 495 F.
See e.g.
Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980) (barring offeror from buying
target's shares for 30 days following amendment of
schedule 13D)
see also Spencer Cos. v. Agency
Rent-a-Car, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982)
(restraining filer of false schedule 13D from voting
acquired shares pending remedial measures)
,

17 C.F.R.,

§240.14e-l

(1986).

,

;

42.

Scientific Computers, Inc. v. Edudata Corp.,
e.g.
599 F. Supp. 1092 (D. Minn. 1983) (denying target's
motion for preliminary injunction, following earlier
grant of temporary restraining order, in view of finding
See

,

,

that prior disclosure violations had been remedied)
746 F.2d 429 (8th
affd. in part and dismissed in part
Cir. 1984)
,

.

43.

See note 260 infra
See also Comment, Antitakeover
Maneuvers:
Developments in Defensive Tactics and Target
Actions for Injunctive Relief 35 SW L.J. 617 (1981).
See generally 1 M. Lipton & E. Steinberger, supra note
32, at §§6.01-6.03.
.

,

Fleischer, supra note 32, at 300-01.

44.

See generally

45.

See note 260 infra and accompanying text.

46.

If the effect of delay is to provoke an auction for the
target firm, the target usually loses its independence.

47.

E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 32, at
Fleischer, supra note 32, at 300; 1 M. Lipton
& E.
Steinberger, supra note 32, at §6.05 [5] [a]; S.
Lome, supra note 32, at 4.05 [3] [b] [i]

See
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1
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A.

,
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.

48.

For discussion of arbitrage activity in takeover contests, see E. Aranow & H. Einhorn, supra note 32, at
§1.07[2]; Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock
Repurchases 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1377, at 1393 n. 60
(1986); Henry, Activities Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers
119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 466 (1971)
,

.

49.

See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 48, at 1393 n. 60
(discussing why target shareholders find it in their
interest to sell to arbitrageurs and offering empirical
evidence supporting this point)

50.

On the latter possibility, see Bradley & Rosenzweig,
supra note 48, at 1392-93 and n. 60.
A related goal of
litigation may be to dissuade arbitrageurs from taking

,

.
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positions in the target's stock in the first place.
See
Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics 32
,

Bus. Law.
51.

1433,

1437

(1977).

e.g.
Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 483
Supp. 116, 119 (E.D. Mo. 1980); S. Lome, supra note
32, §4.05[3] [b] [i]

See

,

,

F.

52.

Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations;
The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers 3 3
Stan. L. Rev. 819, at 865-67 (1981) (arguing that target
managers should be permitted to engage in defensive
tactics that reveal information to potential competing
bidders)
Cf.

,

53.

Conceivably, however, managers intent on pursuit of
their own interests could offer to terminate litigation
in exchange for side payments, such as retention of
their positions with the target, from the offeror.
See
Bebchuck, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment
in Corporate Takeovers
98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1743
,

(1985)
54.

See
n.
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Fleischer, supra note 32, at 301 and 265

98.

55.

See notes 11-20 supra and accompanying text.

56.

15 U.S.C.

57.

See e.g.
MacFaddlen Holdings, Inc. v.
tion Corp., 802 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1986).

58.

15 U.S.C.

§78m(d)

(1982)

59.

15 U.S.C.

§78n(d)
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60.

15 U.S.C.

§78M

61.
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§240 13-d-l

62.
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63.
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64.

See e.g.
Dan River, Inc. v. United Ltd., 624 F.2d
449 U.S. 1101
1216, 1225 (4th Cir. 1980), cert, denied
(1981); W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis,
Smith, Polian, Inc.,
466 F. Supp. 800, 802 (D. Neb.
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1979); Financial General
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[1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
96,403 at 93,425 (D.D.C. April 27, 1978).
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65.

Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F. 2d 355, 366 (2d
See e.g.
460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Seilon,
Cir. 1982), cert, denied
Inc. v. Lamb, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
para. 99,488 at 96,551 (N.D. Ohio July 27,
Rep. (CCH)
1983); Mid-Continent Bancshares, Inc. v. O'Brien, [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 98,734
at 93,708 (E.D. Mo. December 11, 1981).
,

,

,

,

66.

Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries,
See e.g.
Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 499 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 611 F.2d 240,
246 (8th Cir. 1979)

67.

e.g.
Energy Ventures, Inc. v. Appalachian Co., 587
Supp. 734 (D. Del. 1984)
University Bank & Trust Co.
v. Gladstone, 574 F. Supp. 1006, 1011 (D. Mass. 1983);
Polinsky v. MCA, Inc., 680 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.
1982) ("Appellants' pre-tender offer purchase of
Appellee's stock was not a part of the tender offer and,
thus, the purchase was not violative of ... the Williams
Act."); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294,
302-03 (D. Del. 1981)
Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F. Supp. 35, 4849 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
But see In re PaineWebber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc.,
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
para. 83,310 at 85,695 (SEC December 30, 1982) (SEC
administrative law judge holds that by assembling and
acquiring a large block of stock from a number of other
brokers, a major brokerage firm commenced a tender offer, even though the transaction ultimately was executed
on the Pacific Stock Exchange)
Cf Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 848
(2d Circ. 1986), cert
denied 55 U.S.L.W. 3392 (1986)
(letter from a creditor to chairman of the board does
not constitute a tender offer); Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793
F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1986) (private greenmail purchases
are not a tender offer)
Plessey Co. PLC v. General
Electric Co. PLC, 628 F. Supp. 477, 491 (D. Del.
1986) (American press reports of a British tender offer
do not bring the offer within the scope of the Williams
Act)

,

See

,

,

,

F.

;

;

.

,

,

;

.

68.

See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783, 823-24
682 F.2d 355
(S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff 'd on other grounds
denied 460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
(2d Cir. 1982), cert
,

,

69.

,

Cf. Maynard Oil Co. v. Delter Panamerica S.A., [Current]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. para. 92, 773 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (target's
announcement of its intention to purchase its own stock
privately or in the market, to defeat a tender offer, is

not itself a tender offer)
But see Zuckerman v. Franz, 573 F. Supp.

351,

358

(S.D.

.

91

1983) (court finds cash merger proposal satisfied
SEC's eight-factor tender offer test and therefore was
subject to Section 14(e)).

Fla.

70.

See "Allied Stores to Be Bought by Campeau," Wall
Street Journal, November 3, 1986, at 3, 19 (Target and
hostile bidder reach agreement on acquisition after a
federal court allows a large post-bid open-market purchase to proceed)

71.

Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47
("Hanson I")
1985)

(2d Cir.

.

72.

Hanson and two affiliated companies made a
In Hanson I
cash tender offer of $60 per share for all of SCM's outIn response to this tender offer, a
standing shares.
group consisting of certain SCM managers and Merrill
Lynch Capital Markets proposed a leveraged buyout
proposal to $74 per share and was granted a "crown
jewel" lock-up option giving Merrill Lynch the right to
purchase SCM's two most profitable businesses if any
other party acquired more than 66-2/3% of SCM's outstanding shares.
Hanson responded by terminating its
cash tender offer and then purchasing 3.1 million, or
25% of SCM's shares on a single day through one openmarket and five private purchases.
SCM argued that
Hanson's purchases immediately following the termination
of its tender offer amounted to a de facto continuation
of the tender offer and violated Section 14(d).

73.

617 F.

Supp.

74.

Hanson

I

75.

475 F.

Supp. at 823-24.

76.

"[S]ince the purpose of §14 (d) is to protect the illinformed solicitor, the question of whether a
solicitation constitutes a 'tender' offer within the
meaning of §14 (d) turns on whether, viewing the transaction in the light of the totality of the circumstances, there appears to be a likelihood that unless
the preacquisition filing strictures of the statute are
followed there will be a substantial risk that
solicitees will lack information needed to make a
carefully considered appraisal of the proposal put
before them."
774 F.2d at 57.

77.

Id at 57-58.

78.

17 C.F.R.

79.

J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,

,

,

832

(S.D.N.Y.

774 F.2d 47

§240.14a-9

1985).

(2d Cir.

1985).

(1987).
377 U.S.

426,

430-31

(1964).

.

92
80.

Id.

81.

Mills v. Electric Autolite Co., 396 U.S. 375

82.

Id.

83.

The Mills requirement that a Section
at 383-385.
plaintiff
must demonstrate a causal relationship
14(a)
between the violation and the injury for which relief is
sought has been termed the "transaction causation"
See Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp.,
requirement.
421 U.S.
507 F.2d 374, 382 (2d Cir. 1974), cert denied
976 (1975).

at 391.

Id.

,

84.

(1970).

,

The leading case on the mens rea requirement is a Rule
14a-9 action brought against a corporate defendant in
Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir.
in which the Second Circuit relied on differences
1973)
between the statutory authorization for Rules 10b-5, 17
C.F.R. §240.10b-5 (1986), and 14a-9, 17 C.F.R.
§240.14a-9 (1986), to conclude that the Rule 10b-5
scienter requirement should not be extended to Rule
14a-9.
See also Fradkin v. Ernst, 571 F. Supp. 829, 842
(N.D. Ohio 1983). Instead, liability is imposed on
those who "merely negligently drafted" the proxy
statement. Gersthe, 478 F.2d at 1301 n. 20 (2d Cir.
1973); accord Fradkin, 571 F. Supp. at 843.
See also Gould v. American Hawaiian Steamship Co., 351
F. Supp. 853, 860 (D. Del. 1972), vacated and remanded
on other grounds
535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976); cf
Shidler v. All American Life Financial Corp., 775 F.2d
917 (8th Cir. 1985)
The Sixth Circuit, however, has extended the scienter
requirement under Section 14(e) to actions brought
under Rule 14a-9.
See Adams v. Standard Knitting
Mills, Inc., 623 F.2d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1980), cert
denied subnom
Adams v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,
449 U.S. 1067 (1980); accord Resource Exploration v.
Yankee Oil & Gas, Inc., 566 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Ohio
,

,

.

.

.

1983)

,

.

A district court has attempted to reconcile the two
positions by adopting a negligence standard where the
transaction redounded directly to the benefit of the
defendant, while reserving the right to apply a scien
ter requirement where a defendant does not directly
benefit from the proxy solicitation.
See Fradkin, 571
F. Supp. at 843.
85.

TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438,
449

86.

(1976)

.

See Berg v. First American Bancshares, Inc.,
489, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Fradkin v. Ernst,

796 F.2d
571 F.

.

.

93

Supp. 329, 844 (N.D. Ohil 1983).
See also Kademian v. Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614 (7th Cir.
1986) (materiality requires an examination of the "total
minimum" of information available to shareholders at the
time of proxy); Gerstle v. Gamble-Shogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d
1281, 1297 (2d Cir. 1973) (court imposes a test of

materiality which stresses probability rather than mere
The Gerstle test has been rejected by
possibility)
both the Third Circuit and the Delaware Court of
Chancery in favor of a case-by-case approval.
.

87.

See Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 579 F.
725 F.2d
Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd per curiam
189 (2d Cir. 1984); Flum Partners v. Child World, Inc.
557 F. Supp. 492, 498-99 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); cf. Keyser v.
Commonwealth Nat'l Financing Corp., 644 F. Supp. 1130,
1143 (M.D. Pa. 1986) (withdrawn tender offer need not be
disclosed); accord Walker v. ACtion Industries, Inc.,
802 F.2d 703, 709 (4th Cir. 1986); Starkman v. Marathon
Oil Co., 772 F.2d 231, 241 (6th Cir. 1985); Kademian v.
Ladish Co., 792 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1986); GAF Corp. v.
Heyman, 724 F.2d 727, 743 (2d Cir. 1983).
,

88.

See e.g.
Berg, 796 F.2d 489 (D.C. Cir. 1986) finding
several omissions or mis-characterizations but dismissing them as immaterial); Keyser, 644 F. Supp. 1130
(M.D. Pa. 1986) (court rejects a shareholder 14(a) effort
to enjoin a merger allegedly resulting from false
proxies); Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs, 549 F. Supp.
1068, 1073 (D. Del. 1982) (court holds that prospective
bidder's proxy materials misstated Delaware consent
procedure); Camelot Industries v. Vista Resources, Inc.,
535 F. Supp. 1174, 1183 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (court orders
both target and bidder to re-solicit proxies with
corrected disclosures)

89.

17 C.F.R.

90.

Idem

91.

See e.g.
Kalmanovitz v. G. Heileman Brewery Co., Inc.
595 F. Supp. 1385, 1392-3 (D. Del. 1984), aff'd 769 F.2d
152 (3d Cir. 1985)
Sanders v. Thrall Car Manufacturing
Co., 58 2 F. Supp. 945, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd per
uriaus 730 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1984); Schnall v. Schnall,
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para.
[1981 Transfer Binder] FEd
97,927 at 90,714 (S.D.N.Y. March 30, 1981); Berman v.
Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
para. 97,857 at 90,292 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981); Myers v.
American Leisure Time Enterprises, 402 F. Supp. 213,
214-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd without opinion, 538 F.2d
312 (2d Cir. 1976)

(

,

,

§240.13D-101

(1987).

.

,

,

;

,

.

.

.

94

§78r

92.

15 U.S.C.

93.

See

94.

A minority of district courts, purporting to follow the
spirit of recent Supreme Court cases, have held that
neither issuers nor shareholders can seek injunctive
relief under Section 13(d).
This rule, however, has
been softened to permit actions for corrective

,

(1982)

(a)

e.g. Sanders,

.

Supp. at 961.

582 F.

disclosure.

Liberty National Insurance Holding Co. v.
See e.g.
Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 564-67 (11th Cir. 1984);
Atlantic Federal Savings & Loan Association of Fort
Lauderdale v. Dade Savings & Loan Association, 592 F.
,

Supp.
95.

,

1089

(S.D.

Fla.

1984)

.

See e.g.
Portsmouth Square v. Shareholders Protective
Committee, 770 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1985); Gearhart
Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 741 F.2d
707, 714 (5th Cir. 1984)
" [T] arget corporation has
standing to assert a private cause of action for
injunctive relief for violations of Section 13(d).");
HUBCO, Inc. v. Rappaport No. 84-4413, ship op. (D.N.J.
Nov. 1, 1985); Indiana National Corp. v. Rich, 712 F.2d
1180, 1185-86 (7th Cir. 1983); Dan River, Inc. v.
Unitex, Ltd., 624 F.2d 1216, 1224 (4th Cir. 1980).
,

,

(

,

96.

See e.g.
Florida Commercial Banks v. Culverhouse, 772
F.2d 1513, 1520 (11th Cir. 1985) (Eleventh Circuit
reverses dismissal of claim that Schedule 13D failed to
disclose control purpose); K-N Energy, Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Co., 607 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1983) (bidder's
statement that the purpose of its acquisition was
"investment only" was false and misleading and bidder
ordered to disclose its control purpose)
Kaufman &
Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, 522 F. Supp. 35, 44-45
(S.D.N.Y. 1981); Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin
Industries, 495 F. Supp. 488, 500 (W.D. Mich. 1980);
Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp.
611
F.2d 240, 246 (8th Cir. 1979) (Eight Circuit orders
bidder to disclose its control purpose) ; General
Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert 556 F.2d 90, 96 (1st Cir.
1977) (First Circuit affirms finding that bidder failed
to disclose its control purpose)
Gulf & Western
Industries v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 476 F.2d
687, 697 (2d Cir. 1973) (Second Circuit affirms finding
that bidder failed to disclose its control purpose)
,

,

;

,

;

97.

See e.g
Condec Corp. v. Farley, 573 F. Supp. 1382,
1385 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Jewelcor, inc. v. Pearlman, 397 F.
Supp. 221, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
,

,

;

.

95
98.

K-N Energy, 607 F. Supp. 756 (D. Colo. 1983);
See e.g.
Citizens First Bancorp, Inc. v. Harreld, 559 F. Supp.
1982) (bank holding company's
867, 872-73 (W.D. Ky
dissident management and shareholders formed group to
remove current directors)
,

,

.

99.

Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278
at 280 n.

(4th Cir.

1983).

100.

Id.

101.

_Id.

102.

Inc. v. LaFarge Copper S.A.
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
para. 99,148 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 28, 1981), the potential
bidder received confidential information during the
course of friendly negotiations with respect to which it
signed a confidentiality agreement.
When these negotiations failed to result in an agreement and the
target realized that a hostile tender offer was impending, it sought and obtained an injunction to prevent
the offer on the basis that Section 13(d) would require
the disclosure of the confidential information in violation of the agreement.
I_d. at 95, 545.

103.

See Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd.
574 F. Supp. 1172, 1200 (N.D. Ohio 1982); General Steel
Industries, Inc. v. Walco National Corp., [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 98,402 at
92,418 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 24, 1981).
See also Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F.
Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (enjoining bidder from voting
any of its shares until ten days after corrective
disclosures are made).
But see Gearhart Industries,
Inc. v. Smith International, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 717
(5th Cir. 1984) (reversing district court's preliminary
injunction against tender offer because bidder obtained
"blocking position"; Fifth Circuit reasons that goal of
Williams Act is full and fair disclosure, not to tip
scales in favor of incumbent management or bidder)
Plessey Co. PLC v. General Electric Co., PLC, 628 F.
Supp. 477 (D. Del. 1986) (since money damages are
available for 13(d) violations, no injunction); HUBCO,
628 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1985) (right of action limited
to scope necessary to protect shareholders which does
not include such "drastic" relief as recission or
sterilization of shares); Scientific Computers, Inc. v.

2.

"Icahn' s filings appear exceptionally
at 285-86.
thorough.
Icahn clearly and forthrightly set forth its
intent to consider extraordinary corporate transactions
such as a merger or a sale of substantially all of the
corporate assets .... The disclosures here give full
warning that sweeping changes might take place if Icahn
should obtain control."
In General Portland,

,

.

96

slip op. at 10 (D. Minn.
Edudata Corp. No. 4-84-978
1984) (" [E]ven assuming SCI can prove its creeping
acquisition charge, a continuing injunction is not the
proper way to deal with misleading 13(d) filings"),
aff'd 746 F.2d (8th Cir. 1984).
,

,

104.

See also Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
542 F. Supp. 237 (D. Mass. 1982) (bidder enjoined from
"voting or otherwise exercising any rights with respect
to shares" of target stock purchased during period
misleading Schedule 13D was filed)
SEC Litigation
Release No. 9533, reprinted in [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 98,387 at 92,343
(Dec. 21, 1981) (endorsing view that drastic remedies
should be imposed when bidder illegally obtains
"blocking position").
;

105.

San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate
Investment Trust of America, 701 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir.
("[W]e think it unlikely that [the bidder's]
1983).
tactics have given it any 'unfair advantage that
complete disclosure could not cure, or that it has
acquired a 'blocking interest' that will ultimately
frustrate higher bids by rival offerors and harm [the
target's] shareholders.")
Id. at 1010-11.
1

§78n(e)

106.

15 U.S.C.

107.

See e.g.
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472
U.S. 1, 10 (1985); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579, 605 (5th Cir.), cert denied 419 U.S. 873
(1974)

(1982).

,

,

,

,

.

108.

See Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310,
1323 (W.D. Mich. 1978); Applied Digital Data Systems,
Inc. v. Milgo Electronic Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1157
(S.D.N.Y. 1977).
See generally Schreiber, 472 U.S. 1
(Under either provision, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's misrepresentation or nondisclosure caused
its injury)
But see Caleb & Co. v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 615 F. Supp. 96 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (Scienter
not required for actions brought under Rule 14e-l(c)
regarding prompt payment for tendered shares)
.

109.

Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.),
cert denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Lewis v. McGraw, 619
F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1980), cert denied 449 U.S. 951
,

,

,

(1981)

,

.

See also Moravek v. First National Bancorp, No. 86C
4571, slip op. (N.D. 111. July 9, 1986) (Section 14(e)
does not apply until a tender offer, or a definite
intention to make one, is announced); Sanders v. Thrall
Car Manufacturing Co., 582 F. Supp. 945, 968 (S.D.N.Y.

.

.

.

d

.

97

1983) (Section 14(e) does not reach conduct occurring
af f d per curiam
well in advance of tender offer)
730
F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1984)
,

'

,

.

110. MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v. J. B. Acquisition Corp.,
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 92, 939 at 94,
590 (2d Cir. Oct. 6, 1986) (Quoting Prudent Real Estate
v. Johncamp Realty, Inc.
599 F.2d 1140, 1146 (2d Cir.
1979)
,

111.

Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co.,
See e.g.
633 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).

112.

Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith InterSee e.g.
national, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 714 (5th Cir. 1984);
Scientific Computers, Inc. v. Edudata Corp., (D. Minn.
1984) (Available on Lenis) ("For reasons discussed in
Gearhart
the court finds that SCJ [the target] does
have standing [under 14(e)]."), aff
746 F.2d 429 (8th
Cir. 1984); Camelot Industries v. Vista Resources, Inc.,
535 F. Supp. 1174, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("Camelot has
standing to seek an injunction against false and
misleading filings."); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F.
Supp. 783, 817 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("I hold that [the target
corporation] has standing to seek equitable relief
[under Section 14(e)]"), aff 'd
682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir.
460 U.S. 1069 (1983).
1982), cert, denied

,

,

.

.

.

,

,

,

113.

Florida Commercial Banks
1519

(11th Cir.

1985)

v.

Culverhouse, 772 F.2d 1513,

.

114.

Liberty National Insurance Holding Co. v. Charter Co.,
734 F.2d 545 (11th Cir. 1984).

115.

Cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, 430 U.S. 1, 42 n.
28 (1977) (defeated tender offeror had no implied cause
of action for damages under Section 14(e); "[T]he target
corporation's standing to sue [is not] in issue in this

case.")
§78n(d)

116.

15 U.S.C.

117.

Diamond v. Arend, No. 84 Civ. 0751, slip op.
Nov.

118.

25,

(1982).

(S.D.N.Y.

1986)

Diamond v. Arend, No. 84 Civ. 0751 (quoting MacFadden
Holdings, Inc. v. J.B. Acquisition Corp.
802 F.2d 62,
,

71

119.

(2d Cir.

1986)

Gulf & Western Industries v. Great Atlantic
See e.g.
Pacific Tea Co., 476 F.2d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 1978)
(Second Circuit affirms district court order enjoining
tender offer; bidder seeking 15 percent of target's
,

,

&

.

.

.

;

.

;

98

shares failed to disclose its intention to seek
control)
120.

See Valente v. Pepsico, Inc.
(D. Del. 1978)

454 F.

Supp.

1228,

1241-42

.

121.

Weeks Dredging & Contracting, Inc. v. American
See e.g.
Dredging Co., 451 F. Supp. 468, 480 (E.D. Penn. 1978)
(bidder violated Section 14(e) by failing to disclose
its intent to change the duties of management upon
Otis Elevator Co. v.
gaining control of the target)
United Technologies Corp., 405 F. Supp. 960, 969
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (bidder violated Section 14(e) by
failing to disclose its intent to merge with target)
General Host Corp. v. Triumph American, Inc., 359 F.
Supp. 749, 755 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (bidder violated Section
14(e) by failing to disclose its intent to convert
certain of target's assets into cash).
,

;

122.

Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan American Sulphur Co., 423 F 2d
1075, 1085-86 (5th Cir. 1970).
See also Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Madison Fund, Inc., 547
F. Supp. 1383, 1387 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Purolator Inc. v.
Tiger International, Inc., 510 F. Supp. 554, 556 (D.D.C.
.

1981)

.

123

Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599
F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979)

124.

Id. at 1147.
See also Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmanovitz
551 F. Supp.
882-94 (D. Del. 1982) (tender offer enjoined because
bidder failed to disclose financial information conRiggs
cerning two individuals behind tender offer)
National Bank v. Allbritton, 516 F. Supp. 164, 174 (D.
D.C. 1981) (tender offer enjoined because bidder failed
Corenco
to disclose personal financial information)
Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 939,
948-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (tender offer enjoined because
bidder failed to disclose any financial information
about itself), aff'd in relevant part 488 F.2d 207 (2d
Cir. 1973)
But cf Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp.
1128, 1147-48 (D. Or. 1984) (target and acquiror's
failure to disclose in proxy solicitation for exchange
plan that acquiring company had engaged in a number of
leveraged buyouts in the past held not material)
Resource Exploration v. Yankee Gas & Oil, Inc., 566 F.
Supp. 54, 63-64 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (disclosure of future
earnings and other speculative date is discouraged)
,

;

;

,

.

.

125.

Flynn v. Bass Brothers Enterprises, Inc., 744 F. 2d 978
(3d Cir.

1984)

.

.

.

.

.

99

126.

See e.g.
Biechele v. Cedar Point, Inc., 747 F.2d 209
(6th Cir. 1984)

127.

Flynn, 744 F.2d at 988.

128.

Id.

129.

See Weinberger v. Rio Grande Indus., Inc., Civ. No.
7791, slip op., (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1986).
See also
Walker v. Action Indus., Inc., 802 F. 2d 703 (4th Cir.
1986) (holding that financial projections need not be
disclosed, but declining to adopt the Flynn or Starkman
approach)

,

,

130.

Revlon, Inc. v. Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804
(D.C.

Del.

1985)

at 808.

131.

Id.

132.

Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787
(2d Cir. 1969), cert
denied 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
,

133.

See also General Portland, Inc. v. LaFarge
[1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,148 at 95,543 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (court
enjoins tender offer; prospective bidder received
sensitive business information about target and,
pursuant to confidentiality agreement, could not
purchase target shares without target's consent).
I_d.

at 796.

Cooper S.A.

134.

Sonesta International Hotel Corp. v. Wellington
Associates, 483 F. 2d 247 (2d Cir. 1973).

135.

at 251.
See also Davis v. Emerson Insurance Agency, 423 F. Supp.
561, 563 (D. Neb. 1976) (bidder failed to disclose
possible deregistration of target's stock); Commonwealth
349 F.
v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp.
Oil Refining Co.
Supp. 267, 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (bidder failed to disclose
dollar amounts of possible tax exemption losses)
Id.

,

,

136. Alaska Interstate Co.
(D. Del. 1975)

v.

McMillian, 402 F. Supp. 532

at 552-53.

137.

Id.

138.

454 F.

139.

Id.

140.

621 F.

141.

Id.

Supp.

1228

(D.

Del.

1978).

at 1240.

Supp.

at 809.

804

(D.

Del.

1985).

.

.

.

.

.

100
142.

See Pin v. Texaco, 793 F.2d 1448, 1453 (5th Cir. 1986);
cf Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 55 (2d
Cir. 1985) (discussion of purpose and adoption of the
Williams Act)
.

143.

Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462

144.

15 U.S.C.

§78j

145.

17 C.F.R.

§240.10b-5.

146.

15 U.S.C.

§78n(e)

147. Mobil Corp.

1981), cert
148.

(b)

Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366
denied 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
,

See Feldbaum v. Avon Products, Inc., 741 F.2d 234 (8th
Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 717 F.2d
757 (2d Cir.), cert
denied 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
,

149.

(6th Cir.

v.
,

(1977).

,

Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1
(1985) (rejection of tendered shares and institution of
second tender offer are not manipulative where done
openly)

150.

See Lederman, Tender Offer Bidding Strategy
Sec. Reg. 917 (April 18, 1984).

151.

Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1985), cert
denied 106 S. Ct. 3272 (1986).

,

17 Rev.

.

,

152.

at 257-8.

Id.

See also Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.
549 F.
Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md
1982) (court finds two-tier
structure not violative of Section 14(e) since no deception was involved)
,

.

153.

Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448,
1986)

154.

15 U.S.C.

(5th Cir.

Inc.

55 U.S.L.W.

§18.

155. Cargill, Inc. v. Montfort of Colo.,
4027 (Dec. 9, 1986)
156.

1453

.

e.g.
Marathon Oil Co. v. Mobil Corp., 669 F.2d
383 (6th Cir. 1981) (Sixth Circuit enjoins acquisition of oil company by another oil company)
cert
denied 455 U.S. 982 (1982); Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp.,
665 F.2d 10, 11 (2d Cir. 1981) (Second Circuit enjoins
acquisition of aircraft manufacturer by company manu-

See

,

,

378,

,

.

,

facturing aircraft and aircraft components)
F & M
Shaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 597 F.2d 814,
;

.

.

.

101

817-19 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (Second Circuit
enjoins acquisition of brewing company by another
brewing company); Laidlaw Acquisition Corp. v. Mayflower
Group, Inc., 636 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D. Ind. 1986)

(enjoining acquisition of second largest private school
bus firm by the first, in suit by the target).
157.

Harnischf eger Corp. v. Paccar, Inc., 474 F.
See
e.g.
Supp. 1151, 1159 (E.D. Wis. 1979) (court enjoins
acquisition of hydraulic winch purchaser by company
manufacturing winches), aff'd without opinion 624 F.2d
1103 (7th Cir. 1979); Filtrol Corp. v. Slick Corp., 1970
Trade Cas. (CCH) 73, 035 at 88, 055 (CD. Cal. Dec. 29,
1969) (court enjoins acquisition of supplier of clay
absorbents by clay absorbent purchaser)
af f d per
curiam 428 F.2d 826 (9th Cir. 1970).
,

,

,

,

'

,

158.

See e.g.
Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill,
Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 854 (2d Cir.) ("Where, as here, the
acquisition would be neither horizontal nor vertical,
there are strong reasons for making the prohibitions of
Section 7 so ...broad as to interfere materially with
mergers that are rocompetitive in their facilitation of
entry and expansion.... "), cert denied 419 U.S. 883
But see Allis Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v.
(1974).
White Consolidated Industries, 414 F.2d 506, 525-26 (3d
Cir. 1969) (reversing district court, Third Circuit
grants target's request for preliminary injunction
against conglomerate acquisition)
cert, denied
396
U.S. 1009 (1970)
,

,

'

1

,

,

,

159.

55 U.S.L.W.

160.

Grumman, 665 F.2d at 11.

4027

(Dec.

,

1986).

161. Missouri Portland Cement, 498 F.2d at 870.
See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Antitrust Suits By
Targets of Tender Offers 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1155 (1982)
(arguing that targets should not be permitted to block
,

,

tender offers on antitrust grounds)
But see Laidlaw, 636 F. Supp. at 1516-17 (target has
standing to challenge takeover as an antitrust
violation)

—

162.

See Merger Guidelines
Report No. 655 (Part II)

163.

Id.

164.

1984
Trade Reg. Rep.
(June 18, 1984).
,

(CCH)

at 9.

Id.

See generally P

Tone
Antitrust Perspective
.

,

,

Mergers and Acquisitions; The
Twenty-first Annual Corporate

.

.

.

.

102

Counsel Institute (Northwestern Univ. School of Law,
Oct.
165.

20-21,

1982)

See Grumman Corp. v. LTV Corp., 6=533 F. Supp. 1385,
1391 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (target that successfully

challenged hostile acquisition awarded reasonable
attorneys' fees in connection with preliminary
injunction proceeding); Harnischfeger Corp. v. Paccar,
Inc.,

503 F.

Supp.

102,

106

(E.D. Wis.

1980)

(fees

awarded both for proceeding in which preliminary
injunction was granted and proceeding in which it was
affirmed); F & M Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons,
Inc.,

476 F.

Supp.

203,

207

(S.D.N.Y.

1979)

(fees

awarded for proceeding in which injunction was granted)
166.

15 U.S.C.

167.

See Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.,
[1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 98,
742 at 93, 740 (N.D. Ohio, June 11, 1982) (court rejects
target's claim under Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, holding that
neither legislative history nor purpose of Act indicated
any congressional intent to create private right of
action); Hammermill Paper Co. v. Icahn, No. 80-47-B,
slip op., (W.D. Pa. April 24, 1980) (court concludes
that issuer has no private right of action under
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act)

168.

§

15 U.S.C.

§

18 (a)

.

78g.

First Alabama Bancshares, Inc. v. Louder
[1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para.
98,015 at 91,250-52 (N.D. Ala. May 1, 1981) ("Applying
the first three Cort factors to Section 7 and regulations V and X, this court is of the opinion that
Congress did not intend to imply a private remedy under
that statute"); D-2 Investment Co. v. Holloway. [19741975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para.
94,771 at 96,562 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1974) ("I conclude
that no showing has been made of any violation of the
margin requirements ... and in any event [target
management has] no standing to complain.")
Cf Bassler v. Central National Bank, 715 F.2d 308, 313
(7th Cir. 1983) (bidder has no private cause of action
against lender for violation of margin requirements)
See

,

e.g.

,

.

169.

See Pabst Brewing Co. v. Jacobs [1982-1983 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 99,042 at
94,952-53 (D. Minn., March 8, 1982) (examining legislative history of Section 7, court concludes that
"issuer has an implied private right of action under
this section"); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F.
Supp. 199, 241-42 (D. Md.) (preliminarily enjoining
tender offer on account of, among other things, Section

.

.

.

.

.

103

violations by bidder)
af f d per curiam
546 F.2d 25
(4th Cir. 1976); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer
Inc. v. Transamerica Corp., 303 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(target company has standing to allege Section 7 violations by bidder)
See also Pabst Brewing Co. v. Kalmonvitz, 551 F. Supp.
882, 885-89 (D. Del. 1982) (court, allowing target to
bring action under Section 7, holds that tender offer
price, rather than market value of target's shares
immediately prior to tender offer, determines value of
shares as collateral for margin purposes)
7

,

.

'

,

170.

See Revlon v. Pantry Pride, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 804 (D.
Del. Sept. 12, 1985); Nachman Corp. v. Halfred, Inc.,
[1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
para. 94,455 (N.D. 111. July 13, 1973).

171.

621 F.

172.

[1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
para. 94,455 at 95,594.

173.

Fed.

174

Noninvestment Grade Debt as a Source of Tender Offer
Financing
[Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep., para. 84,011

Supp.

Res. Bd

at 814.

Fed.

Docket No. R-0562

.

Sec. L. Rep.

(Jan.

8,

(CCH)

1986).

,

(June 20,
at 88,

1986)

.

175.

Id.

170.

176.

18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68.
See generally J. Solvy, et al., Civil Rico in
Securities Litigation 18 Rev. Sec. & Com. Reg.
(Oct. 9, 1985)
,

,

185

177.

18 U.S.C.

§1962.

178.

18 U.S.C.

§1961

(1)

.

179.

18 U.S.C.

§1961

(5)

.

180.

18 U.S.C.

§1964

(c)

.

181.

Compare Kinsey v. Nestor Exploration, Ltd., 604 F. Supp.
1365 (E.D. Wash. 1985) (in favor of exclusive
jurisdiction) with Chas Kurz Co. v. Lombardi 595 F.
Supp. 373 (E.D. Pa. 1984) and Leubhe v. Marine Nat'l
Bank, 567 F. Supp. 1460 (E.D. Wise. 1983) (in favor of
concurrent jurisdiction)
See also County of Cook v. Midcon Corp., 773 F.2d 892,
court expressed
905 n.4 (7th Cir. 1985) (In dicta
"reluctance" to conclude that exclusive jurisdiction was
required "in light of the normal presumption that state
.

,

,

.

.

.

.

104

courts share concurrent jurisdiction over federal
statutes"
)

182.

See Cianci v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County,
Cal. 3d 903, 221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 710 P. 2d 375 (Cal.
1985)

40

.

183.

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Company,

105 S.

Ct.

3275

(1985)

184. American National Bank
S. Ct. 3291 (1985)

&

Trust Co. v. Haroco, Inc., 105

185.

See e.g.
Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278, 290-91
(4th Cir. 1983); In re Action Industries Tender Offer,
572 F. Supp. 846, 850 (E.D. Va. 1983); Bayly Corp. v.
Marantette [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) para. 98,834 at 94,281 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 1982).

186.

Swanson v. Wabash, Inc., 577 F. Supp. 1308, 1318-20

,

111.

(n.D.

1983)

187.

Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources, Ltd., [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 98,742 at
93,733 (N.D. Ohio June 11, 1982).

188.

Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
[1981-1982] Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rev. (CCH)
para. 98, 631 at 92, 214 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 1981).

189.

See H.R. 5445, 99th Cong. Con. Rec H9365-66.
For a discussion of the availability of injunctive
relief under RICO, see Belgrade, Private Civil Rico
Plaintiffs are Entitled to Equitable Relief Under
2 Rico Law. Rep.
§1964 (a)
537, 537-38 (1985); Blakey,
Reflections on
The Rico Civil Fraud Action in Context:
Bennett v. Berg 58 Notre Dame L. Rev. 237, 332 (1982);
Fricano, Civil Rico:
An Antitrust Plaintiff's
Considerations 52 Antitrust L.J. 361 (1983); Nachwalter
and Blechman, Is There a Prayer for Private Injunctive
Relief After Religious Technology Center v.
Wollersheim ?, 2 Civil Rico Rep. No. 16, part 2 (1986);
Strafer, Massumi, and Skolnick, Civil Rico in the Public
Interest:
"Everybody's Darling"
19 Am. Crim. L. Rev.
Some
712
Wexeer,
Civil
Rico
Comes of Age:
615,
(1982);
Maturational Problems and Proposals for Reform 3 5
Rutgers L. Rev. 285, 311-27 (1983).
.

,

,

,

,

,

190.

See Developments in Takeovers Discussed at PLI
Conference 18 Sec. Rep. & L. Rep. 1636, 1638 (Nov.
,

1986)

.

14,

105
191.

See Legislators React Cautiously to Wall Street Scandal
1986 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 2932, 2932 (Nov. 22, 1986).

192.

Id.

at 2933.

193.

Id.

at 2932.

,

194. Alaska Stat. §§45.57.010-45.57.120 (1986); Ark. Stat.
Ann. §§67-1264 to 67-1264.14 (1980); Conn. Gen. Stat.
Ann. 36-456 to 36-469 (West 1981 and Supp. 1986); 8 Del.
Code Ann. §203 (West 1981 and Supp. 1986); Hawaii Rev.
Stat. §§417E-1 to 417E-11 (1985); Idaho Code §§30-150 to
30-1513 (Michie Supp. 1986); Ind. Code Ann. §§23-2-3.10.5 to 23-2-3.1-11 (Burns 1984); Iowa Code Ann.
§§502.102, 502.211-502.2156 (West Supp. 1986); Kan.
Stat. Ann. §§17-1276 to 17-1285 (1981 and Supp. 1985);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§51:1500-51:1512 (West Supp. 1986);
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110c, §§1-13 (Law Coop. 1985); Mich.
Comp. Laws Ann. §§451 9d-451 917 (West Supp. 1986);
Minn. Stat. Ann. §§80B. 01-80B. 13 (West 1986); Miss. Code
3 Mo.
Ann. §§75-72-101 to 75-72-121 (Supp. 1986)
Ann.
3
Stat.
,409. 500-409.531 (Vernon Supp. 1987); Neb. Rev.
Stat. §§21-2418 to 21-2430 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§78.376 to 78.3778 (1985); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§421-A:1 to 421-A:16 (1983 and Supp. 1986); N.J. Stat.
Ann. §§49:5-1 to 49:5-19 (West Supp. 1986); N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law §§1600-1613 (McKinney 1986); N.C. Gen. Stat.
§§78B-1 to 78B-11 (1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1707.041
(1985); 71 Okla. Stat. Ann. §§431-450 (West Supp. 1987);
70 Pa. Stat. Ann. §§71-85 (Purdon Supp. 1986); S.C. Code
Ann. §§35-2-10 to 35-2-130 (Law Coop. Supp. 1985); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. §§47-32-1 to 47-32-48 (1983); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§48-5-102 to 48-5-112 (1984); Va. Code
§§13.1-528 to 13.1-541 (1985); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§552.01-552.25 (West Supp. 1986).
.

.

;

,

195.

Comments, Beyond CTS
A Limited Defense of State Tender
Offer Disclosure Requirements 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657,
664-65 (1987).
:

,

196.

Thirteen statutes require five percent ownership.
See
e.g.
8 Del. Code Ann. §203(c)(2); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law
Fifteen states require
§1601 (a); 70 Pa. Stat. Ann. §73.
ten percent ownership.
See e.g.
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann.
§36-457 (h); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1701 041 (A) 1
Va.
Code § 13.1-529(b) (i)
One state requires ownership of
See
twenty percent before its statute goes into effect.
Kan. Stat. Ann. §17-1276(a).
,

,

,

.

(

)

;

.

197.

Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 110c, §1; Mich. Comp.
See e.g.
Some states have added to these
Laws Ann. §451.904(1).
they allow application of the
tests a third factor:
statute if a certain percentage of the outstanding
,

,

.

.

.

.

.

106

shares of the target corporation are held by state
residents.
See e.g.
S.C. Code Ann. §35-2-20 (5) (d)
Some states, however, have made efforts to
(5 percent).
See e.g.
limit the scope of their statutes.
Minn.
Stat. Ann. §80 B.01(9) (applying only to targets having
at least 20 percent of their securities held by state
residents)
,

,

,

198.

,

See e.g.
8 Del. Code Ann. §203(a)(l); N.Y. Bus. Corp.
Law §1603; Va. Code §13 1-531 (b)
,

,

.

199.

N.J. Stat. Ann. §49.5-3(a) (West Supp. 1986)
See e.g.
(filing must be twenty days prior to commencement of
offer); N.C. Gen. Stat. §78B-4 (a) (filing must be thirty
days prior to commencement of offer)

200.

See e.g.
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §451.907; N.Y. Bus.
Corp. Law §1604; Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §1707 041 (B) (4)

,

,

,

,

.

201.

e.g.
Alaska Stat. §45.57.010(1) (twenty-one to
thirty-five-day minimum open provision)
Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. §451.905(2) (sixty-day minimum open period).

See

,

,

;

202.

See e.g.
S.C. Code Ann. §35-2-80(3) (withdrawal
allowed any time within twenty days and after
thirty-five days from the commencement of the offer)

203.

Mass. Ann. Laws Ch.
See e.g.
Ann. §1701.041 (c)

204.

Kan. Stat. Ann. §17-1284; Mass. Ann. Ch. 110c, §13; N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §421-A:16; N.J. Stat. Ann. §49:5-18;
N.C. Gen. Stat. §78B-11; N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law §1611.

205.

But see Gunter v. AGO International B.V.
533 F. Supp.
86, 88 (N.D. Fla. 1981) (recognizing exception to the
general rule that for removal based upon federal
question jurisdiction, the federal question must be
presented by the complainant, not by a defense thereto,
court denies motion to remand suit to enforce Florida
Insurance Holding Company Act; "if the state law upon
which the plaintiff relies is entirely pre-empted by
federal law, the case is removable").

206.

e.g ., City Investing Co. v. Simcox, 633 F.2d 56, 64
1980) (upholding district court's decision to
from
considering bidder's claim that state
abstain
takeover statute is unconstitutional)
But see MartinMarietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 690 F.2d 558, 562-64
(6th Cir. 1982) (overturning district court's decision
that action for injunctive relief from Michigan
Take-Over Offers Act was barred by doctrine of
abstention); National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC Corp., 687

,

,

,

,

110c, §7; Ohio Rev. Code

,

See

,

(7th Cir.

.

.

.

.

s

.

107

F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (8th Cir. 1982) (neither Pullman
abstention nor Younger abstention appropriate in case
challenging Missouri Takeover Bid Disclosure Act)
207.

42 U.S.C.

208.

See Martin-Marietta Corp., 690 F.2d at 562 (action under
42 U.S.C. §1983 is an "expressly authorized" exception
to Anti-Injunction Act); National City Lines, 687 F.2d
at 1127 (Anti-Injunction Act inapplicable where federal
court lawsuit is filed prior to state suit)

209.

Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624

210.

CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct.

§1983.

(1982).

1637

(1987)

211.

Ind. Code §23-1-42-7

212.

See e.g
Comments, Beyond CTS:
A Limited Defense of
State Tender Offer Disclosure Requirements 54 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 657, 658 (1987).

(b)

(Supp.

1986).

,

,

,

213.

107 S. Ct. at 1652.
In the wake of the CTS decision,
many states have adopted or amended legislature to limit
hostile takeovers of corporations within the state's
jurisdiction.
For example, the Arizona Governor Evan
Mecham signed on July 22, 1987, a bill to limit hostile
takeovers of Arizona corporations.
The bill (HP 2002)
was proposed by officials of the Phoenix-based Greyhound
Corp.
who claimed that the company was recently the
target of a hostile takeover bid.
Under the new Arizona
law, shares acquired in a "control share acquisition"
cannot be voted except in elections of directors or
managers unless the target's disinterested shareholders
The
approve the acquisition by resolution at a meeting.
law applies to Arizona corporations with at least 50
shareholders.
It also covers companies incorporated in
another state if they have their principal place of
business or principal executive offices in Arizona, have
assets of $1 million or more in the state, and have more
However,
than 500 employees who are Arizona residents.
the law has an "opt-out" provision under which corporations may forgo its protections if the shareholders
wish.
Under the law, after a bidder acquires 20 percent
of a target's stock, the bidder must disclose in an
information statement to shareholders sources of financing and any intentions for plant closings, employee
The
layoffs, or relocation of corporate headquarters.
target's management then has 55 days to hold a
See also Arizona Anti-Takeover
shareholder's meeting.
Bill Signed During Special Legislative Session BNA
,

,

'

,

d

.

.
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Corporate Counsel Weekly, at
1987)

2,

col.

1

(August 22,

.

§§1011-15

214.

15 U.S.C.

215.

See John Alden Life Insurance Co. v. Woods [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 98, 617 at 93,
065 (D. Idaho Dec. 19, 1981); Professional Investors
Life Insurance Co. v. Roussel, 528 F. Supp. 391, 402 (D.
Kan. 198).
But see National City Lines, Inc. v. LLC
Corp., 524 F. Suppl. 906, 910-911 (W.D. Mo. 1981)
(Missouri statute regulating acquisition of insurance
companies preempted by Williams Act)
af f
on other
grounds 687 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1982); Gunter v. Ago
International B.V., 533 F. Supp. 86, 90 (N.D. Fla. 1981)
(Florida statute regulating acquisition of insurance
companies preempted by Williams Act)
Cf Mesa Partners II v. Unocal Corp.
607 F. Supp. 624
(W.D. Okla. 1985) (Oklahoma statute regulating purchase
of natural resource assets chilled takeovers to point of
impinging on Congress' power under Commerce Clause).

(1982).

,

'

,

.

,

216.

Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp. No. 298, 1982,
slip op. (Del. Sept. 21, 1982).

217.

Id. at 3.
But see Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.
549 F.
Supp. 623, 634 (D. Md
1982) (court reaches opposite
conclusion, stating that Martin Marietta would not owe a
fiduciary duty to Bendix)
,

.

218. Treadway Companies v.
1980)

Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357

(2d Cir.

.

219.

_Id.

at 377.

The court rejected Treadway'

s

claim:

"Management—as distinct from the corporation--had no
legitimate claim to Cowin's [the Treadway director]
allegiance.
Rather Cowin owed his fiduciary duties to
the corporation, and through the corporation to the
Treadway has not shown that those duties
stockholders.
were not fulfilled.
Specifically, Treadway has offered
no support for the proposition that the duty of good
faith that Cowin owed to Treadway carried with it a duty
[W] e decline
to disclose any information about Care
to impose on Cowin a duty to disclose his negotiations
with Care. " Id
.

220. Hi-Shear Corp. v.
221.

Klaus, 528 F.2d 225

(9th Cir.

1975).

Lipton & E. Steinberger, Takeovers &
Freezeouts §6.5.2.6 at 318 (1978) (discussing care).
See

I.

M.

.

.

.

.

109
222.

528 F.2d at 232.
See also Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 367 (2d
Cir. 1982) (Defendant's position as director of target
"placed him under no fiduciary duty to reveal to the
company's management his intention to use his [company]
holdings to effectuate a third-party takeover of the
company... or to refrain from promoting a takeover by a
third-party."), cert denied 460 U.S. 1069 (1983);
Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc. [1977-1978
Transfer Binder]
Fed. SEc. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 96,286
at 92,826-28 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 1978) (target alleged
that bidder's dealer-manager was breaching its fiduciary
duty to target because it had received confidential
financial information from target in an unrelated
matter; target's motion for preliminary injunction was
denied); American Medicorp, Inc. v. Continental Illinois
National Bank, 475 F. Supp. 5, 10 (N.D. 111. 1977)
(target, a customer of Continental, sought to enjoin
Continental from financing bidder's tender offer because
of Continental's actual or potential breach of fiduciary
duty; target's motion for preliminary injunction was
denied)
See generally Comment, Tender Offers and "Chinese
Walls":
A Bank's Duty of Confidentiality When Financing
Acquisition of a Customer 1980 Wis. L. Rev. 206. But
see Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A 2d 335 (Del. Ch
1984) (Delaware Court of Chaucery grants preliminary
injunction against a tender offer by Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co. which controlled a majority of the shares
of Shell, for the remaining shares; "there is a
reasonable probability that the defendants have not
offered a fair price for the shares of Shell held by the
minority stockholders and that defendants have not made
a full and complete disclosure of all pertinent facts
with complete candor"); General Portland, Inc. v.
LaFarge Copper S.A., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) para. 99, 148 at 95, 543 (N.D. Tex.
Aug. 28, 1981) (court enjoins tender offer; prospective
,

,

,

,

bidder received sensitive business information about
target and, pursuant to confidentiality agreement, could
not purchase target shares without target's consent).
Cf. Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 490 A. 2d 1050, 1055 (Del.
Ch. 1984) (denying target's motion for summary judgment,
court holds that shareholders' allegation that target
management breached fiduciary duty when it entered into
deal with tender offeror that substantially compromised
shareholders' right to participate in offer stated a
claim of civil conspiracy)
223.

Jacobs v. Pabst Brewing Co., 549 F. Supp. 1050
1982)

224.

Id.

at 1067.

(D.

Del.

.

110
225. Pennzoil Inc. v.
Ch. 1984)

Getty Oil Co., CA. 7425, slip op.

(Del.

.

226.

See Pennzoil Wins 10.53 Billion in Suit Against Texaco;
Verdict is Called Highest Civil Judgment in History The
Wall Street Journal at 3 (Nov. 20, 1985).
,

227.

Id.

228.

See Pennzoil Inc. v. Gettv Oil Co., C.A.
Ch.

(Del.

229.

1984)

7425,

slip op.

.

See How Texaco Turned Big Takeover Victory Into Bigger
Legal Loss The Wall Street Journal at 8 (Dec. 20,
,

1985)
230.

.

See Judgment of $11.1 Billion for Pennzoil Co. is Upheld
but Texaco Gets Concession After Hasty Discussion The
Wall Street Journal at 3 (Dec. 11, 1985).
,

231.

Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d 1133
1986)

(2d Cir.

.

232.

Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Co., 422 U.S. 49

233.

Id.

(1975).

at 59.
See Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International,
Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715 (5th Cir. 1984) (reversing

district court's preliminary injunction against tender
offer because of bidder's failure to disclose its
control purpose in original Schedule 13D; bidder's
subsequent amendment to Schedule 13D to disclose this
purpose "cured" violation; Treadway Companies v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 380 (2d Cir. 1980) (injunction
"Since the infordenied after curative disclosure:
mative purpose of §13 (d) had thereby been fulfilled,
there was no risk of irreparable injury and no basis for
Chromalloy American Corp. v. Sun
injunctive relief.")
Chemical Corp., 611 F.2d 240, 249 (8th Cir. 1979)
(Eighth Circuit refuses to order additional injunctive
Missouri Portland
relief beyond corrective disclosure)
Cement Co. v. H. K. Porter Co., 535 F.2d 388, 394 (8th
Cir. 1976) (injunction denied after bidder made
Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone &
additional disclosures)
Sons, Inc., 488 F.2d 207, 214-15 (2d Cir. 1973) (order
granting bidder permission to make curative amendments
;

;

upheld)
See also Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47, 60
(2d Cir. 1985) ("In this context the preliminary injunction which is one of the most drastic tools in the
arsenal of judicial remedies, [citation omitted], must
be used with great care, lest the forces of the free
market place, which in the end should determine takeover

.

.

.

.

.

Ill

disputes, are nullified."); Hubco, Inc. v. Rappaport,
628 F. Supp. 345 (D.N.J. 1985) (relief limited to
corrective disclosure and injunction until disclosure is
made)
234.

422 U.S.

at 60.

235. Hanna Mining Co. v. Norcen Energy Resources Ltd.,
Supp. 1172 (N.D. Ohio 1982)
236.

574 F.

"Any different result would mean that an acquiring
corporation could engage in the most deliberate form of
misrepresentation in its statutory filings and when its
fraud is discovered merely file corrective amendments
and keep the benefits of its wrongful conduct regardless
of how that conduct may continue to injure shareholders
of the corporation whose stock it has acquired." Id. at
1203.
Inc. v. Walco National Corp.,
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
para. 98,402 at 92,418 (E.D. Mo. 1981).

237. General Steel Industries,

238.

See also Spencer Companies v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc.,
542 F. Supp. 237, 238 (D. Mass. 1982) (bidder enjoined
from "voting or otherwise exercising any rights with
respect to shares" of target stock purchased during
period misleading Schedule 13D was filed)
SEC Litigation Release No. 9533 (Dec. 21, 1981), reprinted in
[1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
para. 98,387 at 92,343 (endorses view that district
courts have power to order divestiture or rescission)
;

239. MacFadden Holdings, Inc. v.
F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1986)

JB Acquisition Corp.,

802

240.

Gearhart Industries, Inc. v. Smith International, Inc.,
741 F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984).

241.

Id.

242.

Id.

243.

at 715.

Id.

See also Drobbin v. Nicolet Instrument Corp., 631 F.
Supp. 860, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (court refuses to sterilize shares for 14(f) violation, but enjoins voting of
shares until 10 days after corrective disclosure is made
in response to a 13(d) violation); Hubco Inc. v.
Rappaport, 628 F. Supp. 345, 354 (D.N.J. 1985) (13(d)
right of action limited to seeking corrective
disclosures)
244.

Dan River, Inc. v. Icahn, 701 F.2d 278

(4th Cir.

1983).

.
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at 286.

245.

Id.

246.

"A conclusion that an offeror has failed to make full
disclosure must, at bottom, rest upon a finding that the
shareholders are being deprived of information necessary
The best remedy for
to evaluate an act upon the offer.
such a problem is to get more information to the
shareholders before they have to decide whether or not
Id
to tender their shares."
.

at 287.

247.

Id.

248.

San Francisco Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate
Investment Trust of America, 701 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir.
1983)

249.

Id. at 1010.
" [A] n
The First Circuit stated:
injunction forbidding
an acquisition is not, except in the most egregious
case, the preferred or even proper remedy.
In many
situations, failure to disclose can be cured by an order
requiring appropriate disclosure. And, when that order
is insufficient, injunctive relief should be designed to
help the victims of the inadequate disclosure, not to
hurt them."
Id.

250.

Id.

at 1009.

251. Electronics Speciality Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969).

at 947.

252.

Id.

253.

For a discussion of the various strategic considerations
that lead targets to sue hostile bidders, see generally
Chapter 1 infra notes
,

254. For a discussion of defensive measures, see Gibson, A
Structural Approach to Corporations:
The Case Against
Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers
33 Stan. L. Rev. at
86 8 (1981)
Bebchuck, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers 95 Harv. L. Rev. at 1038-41
(1982)
.

;

,

.

255.

See note 12 supra

256.

Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets:
28 J. L. & Econ. at
Do Interests Diverge in a Merge?
Jarrell concedes that these cases are
153 (1985).
"difficult to square" with his hypothesis that "the goal
of target management is to increase the takeover price
and not to drive away all bids."
I_d. at 152-53.
Unfortunately, Jarrell does not examine the precise role

.

,

.

.
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of litigation in these twenty-one cases.
Thus, his
study does not reveal whether a target in a particular
case owes its independence to the target's lawsuit or to
the effectiveness of other defensive measures.
257.

Rosenzweig, Target Litigation 85 Mich. L. Rev. 110,
127-29 (1986).
Rosenzweig examined a sample of
fifty-three defeated hostile tender offers compiled by
Kidder, Peabody & Co.
See Kidder, Peabody & Co.,
Summary of Defeated Hostile Tdner Offers 1973-1985
(July 26, 1985).
The original Kidder, Peabody & Co.
study was considered by the SEC s Advisory Committee on
Tender Offers and has been critically analyzed by Frank
Easterbrook and Gregg Jarrell.
See Easterbrook &
Jarrell, Do Targets Gain From Defeating Tender Offers?
59 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 277, 287-91 (1984).
,

'

,

258.

Rosenzweig, supra note 257 at 128.

259.

Id.

260.

I_d. at 129.
In 10 cases, the court granted injunctive
relief that effectively defeated the takeover bid.
In
the remaining 12 cases, the court granted relief that
delayed execution of the tender offer beyond the usual
20-day waiting period prescribed by SEC Rule 14e-l, 17
C.F.R.§240. 14e-l (1986).
These delays appeared to contribute significantly to target's resistance, in most
cases by providing managers the time they needed to
mount their successful defense.
In a few cases, the
court-ordered delay evidently increased the risk of the
offer sufficiently to convince the bidder to withdraw.

Id

.

at 128-29.

at 129, n.

75.

See also Empirical Research Project, Defensive Tactics
to Hostile Tender Offers - An Examination of Their
Legitimacy and Effectiveness 11 J. Corp. L. 651, 700-01
and n. 440 (1986) (reporting that outcome of control
contests favored 60% of litigating targets but only 43%
of non-litigating targets in sample studied)
,

261.

It would be interesting to know how often target
defenses succeed in the absence of litigation; such date
would provide a better sense of the particular role
played by target lawsuits - as distinguished from
management resistance in general - in defeating unwanted
bids

262.

See note 260 supra

263.

See Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control:
A Critical Assessment of the Tender Offer's Role in
Corporate Governance 8 4 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1178, n.
95 (1984); Jarrell & Bradley, The Economics Effects of

.

,

.
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Federal and State Regulations of Cash Tender Offers
J.

264.

L.

Econ.

&

371,

373,

388,

405

,

23

(1980).

See e.g.
Ruback, Assessing Competition in the Market
for Corporate Acquisitions
11 J. Fin. Econ. 141, 147
(1983) (reporting a 75% failure rate for first bidders
where a subsequent bid is made.)
A 1986 unpublished
study reports on 67% failure rate for first bidders.
,

,

,

265.

See note 257 supra

266.

Jarrell, supra note 256, at 169.

267.

Jarrell, supra note 256, at 152-153.

268.

See Chapter IV infra

269.

See e.g.
Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate
Control:
The Scientific Evidence
11 J. Fin. Econ. 5,
10-16
at
(1983) (summarizing empirical studies).
,

.

.

,

,

270.

See note 266 supra

.

271.

See note 263 supra

.

272.

See e.g.
Jarrell & Poulsen, Shark Repellents and
Poison Pills:
Stockholder Protection - From the Good
Guys or the Bad Guys?
4 Midland Corp. Fin. J. 39, 40
(1986) (arguing that target litigation benefits target
shareholders)
,

,

,

273.

See e.g.
Schwartz, Search Theory and the Tender Offer
Auction 2 J. L. Econ. & Org. 229, at 229-30, 249-51;
Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982)
,

,

,

.

,

274.

Commentators disagree sharply on whether an auction
market generally increases target shareholder wealth.
Compare Schwartz, supra note 274, and Easterbrook &
Fischel, supra note 274 (aruging that the likelihood of
bidding contests reduces the probability of an initial
offer being made, which rebounds to the detriment of
shareholders), with Bebchuck, supra note 254, and
Gibson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity
in Tender Offer Defense
35 Stan. L. Rev. 51 (1982)
(arguing that the possibility of an auction does not
See also Coffee,
significantly deter initial bids).
supra note 310, at 1175-83 (essentially agreeing with
Bebchuk and Gibson, on the ground that the market
believes the demand curve for corporate control is
inelastic); Carney, Two-Tier Tender Offers and Shark
Repellents 4 Midland Corp. Fin. J. 48, 51-52 (1986)
(arguing that Easterbrook and Fischel implicitly assume,
,

,

.

.

.
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incorrectly, that the supply curve for target shares is
perfectly elastic); Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A
Theory of Tender Offers 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 153, 205-14
(1986) (arguing that auctioneering rule increases social
welfare by increasing supply of potential targets that
invest in synergistic strategies)
,

275.

Jarrell, supra note 256, at 163, 171.

276.

See e.g.
Pound Takeover Defeats Hurt Stockholders: A
Reply to the Kidder Peabody Study 4 Midland Corp. Fin.
J. 33, 71 (1986) (rebutting suggestion of study by
Kidder, Peabody & Co. that target shareholders benefit
from defeat of hostile bids); Eradley & Rosenzweig,
Defensive Stock Repurchases 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1377, 1389
N. 5 (1986) (reviewing empirical evidence that while
tender offer announcement results in significant
increase in price of target shares regardless of offer's
outcome, price increase is permanent revaluation only
for targets ultimately taken over, with price incerase
for targets remaining independent dissipated over
subsequent six months)
,

,

,

,

277.

Gordon & Kornhauser, Takeover Defensive
See e.g.
Tactics:
A Comment on Two Models
96 Yale L. J. 295,
296-97 (1986)
,

,

278.

Rosenzweig, supra note 257, at 133.

279.

Jarrell, supra note 256, at 153.

280.

See note 269 supra

.

281. While some managers profess to believe that their
shareholders will fare better in the long run if
takeover is avoided, the evidence appears compellingly
the other way.
See authorities cited at note 276 supra
The one study that purports to be the contrary has been

effectively discredited.
See Easterbrook & Jarrell,
287-91
(showing that study by Kidder,
supra note 257 at
Peabody & Co. is in fact consistent with studies
demonstrating that targets lose from defeating hostile
bids, if one takes into account overall market
movements); Pound, supra note 276.
282.

Jarrell, supra note 256, at 152.

283.

See

284.

Id.

285.

Hertzberg, Takeover Targets Find Loading Up
See e.g.
on Debt Can Fend Off Raiders, Wall St. J., Sept. 10,

,

e.g.

,

Jarrell, supra note 256 at 160.

at 160-161.
,

,

.

.

.

.

.
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1985, at 1, col. 6 (noting the observation of some
takeover lawyers that targets are relying less on
litigation as a defensive measure)
While some
specialists recognize the tactical value of litigation,
they clearly reject the use oflitigation for purely
tactical reasons.
Fleischer, Tender
See e.g.
1 A.
Offers:
Defenses, Responses, and Planning, at 299
(2d ed. 1983 and Supp. 1985)
& n. 22
.

,

,

286.

See M. Bradley, A. Desai & E. Kim, Gains from Corporate
acquisitions and Their Division Between Target and
Acquiring Firms 3-4 (rev. ed. July 1986) (unpublished)

287.

Rosenzweig, supra note 257, at 135.

288.

See

289.

SEC Rule 14e-l,

290.

The SEC's Advisory Committee on Tender Offers has
recommended such a change.
See Securities and Exchange
Commission Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report
of Recommendations, Recommendation 17 (July 8, 1983)
(recommending extension of the minimum offering period
to 30 days)

291.

Schwartz, supra note 273; Easterbrook &
See e.g.
Fischel, supra note 320 (arguing that permitting target

,

e.g.

,

,

1

A.

Fleisher, supra note 285.
17 C.F.R.

§240.14e-l

(1986).

,

managers to stimulate auctions is generally not in the
best interests of target shareholders)

Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a
See e.g.
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer 9 4
Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1197-98 (discussing target
management's conflict of interest).
293. See notes 257-260 supra and accompanying text.
292.

,

,

,

294.

See Chapter I, supra

295.

e.g.
Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock
Repurchases 99 Harv. L. Rev. 1377, 1408-12 (1986);
Jensen & Ruback, supra note 269, at 6; Bradley,
Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate
Control 53 J. Bus. 345 (1980).

See

,

.

,

,

,

supra note 254, at 868-70 (arguing in favor
of rules that would permit defensive tactics limited to
the threat or success of securing a higher officer)

296.

Cf. Gibson,

297.

Proponents of target litigation might suggest an
additional argument in its favor:
target lawsuits help
enforce legal rules that presumably embody social goals,

117

Thus, even assuming that litigating managers have impure
motives, and that target lawsuits diminish shareholder
wealth and impose significant costs on society, target
litigation, can be socially valuable as a means of
enforcing the law.
See Yablon, Contention Disclosure
and Corporate Takeovers
6 Cardozo L. Rev. 429, 429-30
This is a variant of the argument favoring
(1985).
standing for private attorneys general:
a plaintiff's
self-interest in prosecuting a claim vigorously can
serve society's interests by furthering the policies
that underlie the legal rule the plaintiff invokes.
See
generally Frankel, Implied Rights of Action 67 Va. L.
Rev. 553 (1981); Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the
Williams Act After Chris-Craft: A Leaky ship on
Troubled Waters 34 Bus. Law 117 (1978).
To put this
somewhat more specifically, target litigation could be
preferred as a means of promoting auctions, on the
ground that target management will succeed in thwarting
a takeover through a legal victory only where, by
hypothesis, there is something illegal about the
takeover effort.
There are at least two responses that may be made to
this "private attorneys general" defense of target
litigation.
First, it is arguably the obligation of the
target management to promote the shareholders'
interests, rather than the interest of the public
generally, in responding to a tender offer.
Second, and
more broadly, where private enforcement of the law
exacts significant costs that may be avoided without
sacrificing the law's objectives, the private attorney
general notion seems less compelling.
,

,

,

298.

"Raiding" is the expropriation of target shareholders
wealth through the acquisition of control over the
target's resources for less than their fair market
Carney, Shareholder Coordination
value.
See e.g.
The Case
Costs, Shark Repellants, and Takeout Mergers:
Against Fiduciary Duties 1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J.
341, 349 (1983); Lowenstein, Prunning Deadwood in
Hostile Takeovers:
83
A Proposal for Legislation
Colum. L. Rev. 249, 307-09 (1983); see also Bradley &
Rosenzweig, supra note 295, at 1409.
,

,

,

,

299.

The "prisoner's dilemma" in takeover situations is a
function of the uncoordinated wealth-maximizing
decisions that individual target shareholders make.
Individual shareholders, acting in their self-interest
and unable either to communicate or enforce agreements
with fellow shareholders regarding their responses to a
tender offer, may take action that reduces both their
wealth and that of the other shareholders. See e.g.
M. Bradley & E. Kim, The Tender Offer as a Takeover
Device:
Its Evolution, the Free Rider Problem, and the
,

,

.

.

.

.

.
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Prisoner's Dilemma 18-26 (rev. ed. Apr. 1985)
(unpublished); Jensen & Ruback, supra note 269,
at 31-32.

Jarrell, supra note 256, at 157.

300.

See

301.

See note 298 supra

302.

Jarrell, supra note 256, at 156.

303.

Bradley, Desai & Kim, supra note 286;
See
e.g.
Jensen & Ruback, supra note 269; Jarrell & Bradley,
supra note 263; Bradley, supra note 295.
These studies
show only that target firms are not generally acquired
for less than their pre-offer value.

304.

See e.g.
Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at
1415-16; Bradley & Rosenzweig, Defensive Stock
Repurchases and the Appraisal Remedy 96 Yale L. J. 322,
334-35 (1986)

e.g.

,

.

,

,

,

.

,

,

,

305.

On the other hand, even a losing bidder will capture
some rents if it has hedged by purchasing target shares
in the open market; such shares can be sold at a profit
to the winning bidder.
See Gibson, supra note 274, at
53-54; Gilson, supra note 254, at 871-72; Bebchuk, The
Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers 95 Harv.
L. Rev. 1028, 1034-38; see also Office of the Chief
Economist, The Economics of Any-or-All, Partial, and
Two-Tier Tender Offers Table 9 (Apr. 19, 1985)
(reporting average pre-offer target holdings of 18% by
any-or-all bidders, 5% by two-tier bidders, and 12% by
partial bidders in the period 1981 through 1984)
,

,

306.

See e.g.
Carney, supra note 274, at 50 (arguing that
"sunk cost" problems may deter entry of subsequent
bidders); Leebron, supra note 274, at 196-97 (arguing
that budgetary constraints and possibility of sequential
auctions may reduce the incentive of a potential bidder
to compete for control of a particular target)

307.

See supra note 288.

308.

See notes 275 and 276 supra (arguing that litigation
often impedes efficient reallocations of target assets)

309.

Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing, Exchange Act
See e.g.
Release No. 21079 [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) paragraphs 86,637 at 86,919 (June 21, 1984);
Bebchuck, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment
98 Harv. L. Rev. 1693, 1747-88
in Corporate Takeovers

,

,

,

,

,

(1985)

.

.
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Bebchuck, supra note 309, at 1747-55.

310.

See

311.

The direct costs of this mechanism seem relatively
small, see
id
at 1748-49, and it would impose none of
the social costs that can arise from unfettered litigation by self-interested target managers.

,

e .g.

,

,

.

312.

See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at 1412-28
(arguing that allowing defensive self-tenders, subject
to requirements that they be nondiscriminatory and for
no fewer than the number of shares being sought by the
bidder, assures that control-winning bid will be made by
the management that can maximize the value of the
target)

313.

See

314.

See also Carney, supra note 298 (proposing use of
fair-price charter amendments as lowest-cost response to
value-decreasing two-tier bids)

315.

Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at
See, e.g.
1408-12; Jensen & Ruback, supra note 269, at 6; Bradley,
supra note 342.
These commentators recognize that the
gains that accrue to target shareholders may derive from
any of a number of sources; they do not assume that
tender-offer gains generally result from the ouster of
inefficient or self-dealing target managers.
Instead,
they favor a "general synergy theory" to the effect that
the sources of takeover gains may vary from one transaction to the next.
See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra
note 276, at 1409-11 (discussing alternative sources of
takeover gains and rejecting notion of a general theory

,

Bebchuck, supra note 309, at 1742-44.

,

explaining tender offers; Gilson, supra note 254, at
853, 873-74; Bebchuck, supra note 305.
"...fair
& Rosenzweig, supra note 276.
competition among rival management teams can prevent
acquiring firms from effecting value-decreasing
takeovers and target managers from defeating
value-increasing acquisitions." Id., at 1411.

316. See Bradley

317. Numerous courts have noted that target lawsuits against
bidders can significantly tip the competitive balance in
Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM
takeover battles.
See e.g.
Corp. 774 F.2d 47, 60 (2d Cir. 1985); Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 269 (2d Cir. 1984);
Gearhart Indus, v. Smith Intl., Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 715
(5th Cir. 1984); Liberty Natl. Ins. Holding Co. v.
Charter Co., 734 F.2d 545, 566 (11th Cir. 1984); Equity
Oil Co. v. Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., 596 F. Supp.
507, 511, 514 (D. Utah 1983); Marshall Field & Co. v.
,

,

.

.

.

.

;

;
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Icahn, 537 F. Supp. 413, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Standard
Metals Corp. v. Tomlin, 503 F. Supp. 586, 603 (S.D.N.Y.
1980); Gateway Indus, v. Agency Rent-A-Car, Inc., 495 F.
Supp. 92, 101 (N.D. 111. 1980).
For recent decisions discussing more generally the
importance of an "even playing field" in corporate
control contests, see Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798
F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (enjoining target managers from
attempt to exempt leveraged buyout proposal from
appraisal provisions, on ground that exemption would
unfairly disadvantage competing interfirm bidder)
Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. 781 F.2d
264, 283 (2d Cir. 1986) (enjoining "lock-up option" on
ground that it inappropriately favored one bidder)
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A. 2d
173, 184 (Del. 1986) (same with respect to "no-shop"
provision)
See also Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276 at 1406-08
(arguing that advantaging one management team in a
control contest contravenes the neutrality principle
embodied in the Williams Act)
318.

See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at 1421-27
(proposing safeguards that would prevent target managers
from using defensive self-tender offers to defeat
value-increasing acquisitions)

319.

See Bebchuck,

320.

See Rosenzweig, supra note 257, at 139.

321.

See Chapter I, supra

322.

See note 281 supra and accompanying text.

323.

See generally E. Aranow, H. Einhorn & G. Berlstein,
DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
107-93 (1977) (surveying target lawsuit claims and
standing issues)

supra note 309, at 1743.

.

324. The mentality that lawyers have helped to create

regarding anti-takeover lawsuits arguably reinforces
But see note 285 supra
this belief in target managers.
325.

Rosenzweig, supra note 257, at 142.

326.

For example, transfer sales between parent and
subsidiary corporations in which products are purchased
at below-market prices or sold at above-market prices.
See Bradley & Rosenzweig, supra note 276, at 1412 n.
129.

327.

Rosenzweig, supra note 257 at 142.

.
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328.

See e.g.
Radol v. Thomas, 772 F.2d 244, 256-57 (6th
Cir. 1985); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d
271, 293-95 (7th Cir.), cert
denied 454 U.S. 1092
(1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357,
380-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth,
Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 701-04 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292-93 (3d Cir. 1980), cert
denied 450 U.S. 999 (1981)
But see Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986)
(invalidating grant of lockup option as breach of
directors' fiduciary duties); Dynamics Corp. of America
v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming
injunction against enforcement of shareholder rights
plan adopted by target management)
Norlin Corp. v.
Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1984)
(narrowing circumstances in which business judgment rule
will apply to takeover defenses)
Minster Acquiring
Corp. v. AMF, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1261 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (shifting to target managers burden of showing
propriety of defensive tactics in certain circumstances)
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc. 506 A. 2d 173 (Del. 1986) (holding that management's
grant of lock-up option to one of two competing bidders
constituted breach of fiduciary duty)
,

,

,

,

.

.

,

;

;

;

329.

See e.g.
Gearhart Indus. V. Smith Intl., Inc., 741
F.2d 707 (5th Cir. 1984); Martin Marietta Corp. v.
Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md 1982) (counter
tender offer)
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.
493
A. 2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (discriminatory self-tender
offer); Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A. 2d 1346
(Del. 1985) (share purchase rights plan).
,

,

.

;

330.

,

Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271
(7th Cir.), cert
denied 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Grumman
Corp. v. LTV Corp., 533 F.Supp. 1385 (E.D.N.Y. 1982);
Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D.
Commonwealth Oil Ref Co. v. Tesoro
Mich. 1978)
Petroleum Corp., 394 F.Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
See

,

e.g.

,

,

,

.

;

331.

See note 276 supra and accompanying text.

332.

See Bebchuck, supra note 254; Bebchuck The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and
Extension 35 Stan. L. Rev. 23 (1982); Cohn supra note
20; Gilson, supra note 52; Gilson, supra note 274.
,

,

,

333.

See Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer 94 Harv. L.
Rev. 1161 (1981); Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and
35 Stan. L. Rev. 1 (1982);
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers
Schwartz, supra note 273.
,

,
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334.

See Bebchuck, supra note 254, at 1029; Bebchuck, supra
note 53, at 1743; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
333, at 1192-94; see also Gilson, supra note 52, at
878-79, Leebron, supra note 274, at 217-19.

335.

See note 276 supra and accompanying text.

336.

See notes 315-317 supra and accompanying text.

337.

See

338.

See note 297 supra

339.

Both the common law, see e.g.
Ross v. Bernhard, 396
U.S. 531, 534-35 (1970), and modern state corporation
codes, see e.g.
N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law and 626 McKinney
(1986); Del. Code Ann. §327 (1983); Model Bus. Corp.
Act. §7.40 (1986), authorize shareholders to sue
derivatively on behalf of their corporation to redress
corporate injuries. While one usually thinks of derivative actions as a means of enforcing management+s
fiduciary obligations, see e.g.
Fischel & Bradley, The
Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 71
Cornell L. Rev. 261 (1986); Coffee, The Unfaithful
Champion:
The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder
Litigation Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1985, at 5;
Scott, Corporation Law and the American Law Institute
Corporate Governance Project 35 Stan. L. Rev. 927
(1983); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney General:
Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not
Working 42 MD. L. Rev. 215 (1983); Coffee & Schwartz,
An Evaluation and
The Survival of the Derivative Suit:
81 Colum. L. Rev. 261
a Proposal for Legislative Reform
they have always been available for the
(1981)
See
assertion of claims against third parties as well.
United Cooper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244
U.S. 261 (1917); Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450 (1882).
Of course, it is axiomatic that shareholders may bring
derivative actions only to vindicate rights belonging to
See generally W. Cary & M. Eisenberg,
the corporation.
H. Henn &
Corporations 869-99 (5th ed. unabridged 1980)
J. Alexander, Laws of Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises, §360 (3d ed. 1983)

,

e.g.

authorities cited at note 32 supra

,

.

,

,

,

.

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

,

;

.

340.

Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light and Power Assn.,
101 N.W. 2d 423 (1960); Denney v.
(6th Cir. 1964);
& Buttorff Corp., 331 F.2d 249
Tanzer v. Huffines, 345 F. Supp. 279 (D. Del. 1972).
See generally Hornstein, The Counsel Fee in Stockholder's Derivative Suits 39 Colum. L. Rev. 784 (1939);
Mowrey, Attorney Fees in Securities Class Action and
See e.g.
257 Minn.
Phillips
,

,

362,

,

.

.
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Derivative Suits 3 J. Corpo. L. 267 (1978); Leubsdorf,
The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards
90 Yale
,

,

L.

341.

J.

473

(1981)

Fischel & Bradley, supra note 339, at 271
See e g.
(noting that plaintiff's attorney "has very little
incentive to consider the effect of the action on [the]
shareholders, the supposed beneficiaries, who ultimately
bear the costs"); Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General supra note 612, at 232 ("[T]he plaintiff's
attorney is subject to a serious conflict of
interest.
See generally Coffee Unfaithful
"
Champion supra note 339.
,

,

.

,

.

.

.

)

,

.

,

342.

See generally Garth, Nagel & Plager, Empirical Research
and the Shareholder Derivative Suit;
Toward a
Better-Informed Debate Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer
1985, at 137.
,

,

343.

e.g.
Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 383 U.S.
371 (1966)
see also Coffee, Unfaithful Champion
supra note 339, at 13, for an economic analysis of why
lawyers find it worthwhile to bring frivolous actions.
See generally Coffee, Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney:
The Implications of Economic Theory for
Private Enforcment of Law Through Class and Derivative
Actions 86 Colum. L. Rev. 669 (1986)

See

,

,

363,

;

,

,

,

344.

.

For proposals designed to align more closely the interests of derivative and class action lawyers and their
clients, see Coffee, Rescuing the Private Attorney
General supra note 339; Coffee, Unfaithful Champion
supra note 612.
,

,

Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1 (1977)
(denying bidder standing, qua target shareholder, to sue
competing bidder for damages under §14 (e) of the

345. Cf.

Williams Act)
346.

Cf. Baron Tender Offers and Management Resistance
38 J. Fin. 331, 342 (1983) (proposing ban on all

,

defensive measures); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 333, at 1198 (same); Gilson, supra note 52, at
878-79 (proposing ban on all defensive measures except
those that might facilitate an auction for the target's
shares); Bebchuck, supra note 332, at 1029 (same).
347.

See notes 40-46 supra and accompanying text.

348.

See note 297 supra and accompanying text.

349.

Cf.

Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 333, at 1201
(proposing a "rule of passivity" forbidding management

.

.

.

.
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from employing and defensive tactic, including
litigation)
350.

Target managers, for example, might still be tempted to
sue bidders in the hope that their lawsuit might be a
"show-stopper." While the increasing reluctance of
courts to enjoin tender offers makes this result less
likely than it once was, and while "show-stoppers" are
rare where the target's lawsuit is purely tactical,
self-interested managers would have little reason to
refrain from suing.
Similarly, other strategic
considerations that induce target managers to litigate
would be largely unaffected by the suggested passivity
rule.

351. Coffee,

supra note 24, at 15.

to put this more broadly, the propriety of target
suits could be judged by reference to management's duty
of loyalty rather than its duty of care.
See Oesterle,
Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target
Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity
Thesis 71 Cornell L. Rev. 53, 69, 88-89 (1985)
(proposing that target managers be required to show by
clear and convincing evidence why acts designed to
defeat a tender offer are in shareholders' best
interests, but suggesting that managers able to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that a potentially
"reversible" defense (such as litigation) was invoked
only as a negotiating play, be permitted to justify
their action by demonstrating by preponderance of the
evidence the reasonableness of their gambles)

352. Or,

,

353.

See authorities cited at note 328 supra

.

Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the
Corporate Web 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1986).

354. Coffee,

,

355. A "golden parachute" is a contract with (usually) the
top employees of a corporation which is designed to
provide financial protection to an employee in the event
Insofar as
of a takeover or change in control.
employees
deplete the
financial awards to outgoing
presence
of such
the
assets of the corporation,
attractive to a
corporation
less
contracts may make the
Kramer v. Western Pacific
bidder.
See
e.g.
Industries, Inc., Civ. No. 8675, slip op. (Del. Ch
Nov. 7, 19 86)
,

,

356.

See Coffee, supra note 354, at 106.

357.

Id.. Moreover, to the extent that managers placated by
golden parachutes may be less likely to act to stimulate

.
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auctions, such provisions may impose substantial costs
on target shareholders.
While a manager with a golden
parachute would be rewarded whether the company is taken
over by the initial or a subsequent bidder, if the
manager values the golden parachute more than he values
control of the company, he may prefer the former, since
earlier rewards are worth more than later ones and an
effort to stimulate an auction could defeat the initial
bid without enticing others to enter the bidding.
Cf
id
at 107 (responding to claim that golden parachutes
may be "indecent and even corrupting").
,

.

Civ.

358.

Fed.

359.

See generally, Notre, The Dynamics of Rule 11:
Preventing Frivolous Litigation by Demanding Professional
Responsibility 61 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 300 (1986)
Nelken,
Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling"
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and
Punishment 74 Geo. L.J. 1313 (1986)
S. Kassin, An
Empirical Study of Rule 11 Sanctions (1985)

R.

,

P.

11.

;

,

,

;

.

since rejection of the business judgment rule
would address the problem of frivolous target litigation
only indirectly, imposing direct penalties for the
filing of meritless claims would seem sensible even if
the courts were to hold litigious managers to a higher
standard.
See generally R. Clark, Corporate Law §1510

360. Moreover,

(1986)

.

.

.

.

.
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